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# East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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22 March 1984

## EAST EUROPE REPORT

### POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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TRAITS CHARACTERISTIC OF MARXIST-LENINIST PARTIES CLARIFIED

Prague NOVA MYSL in Czech No 1, 6 Dec 83 pp 104-120

[Article by Prof Yevgeniy Yosifovich Bugayev, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of KOMMUNIST, Moscow: "Basic Principles of the Leading Role of the Party"]

[Text] Without a truly revolutionary political party the working class can neither be victorious over the bourgeoisie nor build a new society without exploiters and based on the social ownership of the means of production. The very founders of Marxism-Leninism were aware of this fact. F. Engels wrote:

"If the proletariat is to have enough strength for victory at the critical moment it is essential, and Marx and I have been defending this position since 1847, that it create an independent party different from all the others, against them, a consciously class-based party."

During preparations for the founding of a party of the working class in Russia, V.I. Lenin decided that such a party, in contrast to the opportunism of the fragmented social democratic parties of Western Europe, had to be a truly revolutionary, Marxist, strictly class-oriented party which would regard the essence of its activity not as the concoction of plans for the reorganization of society, not preaching to the capitalists and their henchmen about improving the lot of the working class, not as the organization of conspiracies, "but the organization of the class struggle of the proletariat, the directing of that struggle, the final objective of which would be the seizure of political power by the proletariat and the organization of a socialist society."

In this kind of independent, militantly Marxist revolutionary party of the working class Lenin perceived "the sole guarantor of the victory of socialism and the path to that victory that is most free from any kind of vacillation."

Historical practice has confirmed the correctness of the views of the founders of Marxism-Leninism. The experiences of every country which has embarked or is embarking on the socialist path of development, both experiences from successful progress along this path as well as lessons from the defeats which more than one country has experienced, confirm unambiguously that leadership by a Marxist-Leninist party in the struggle of the working class, the working masses, is one of the general characteristics of the building of a socialist society.

This objective law of an increase in the leading role of a Marxist-Leninist party in socialist transformation is implemented by real people, by party members, their cadres and supervisory organs. Once these people begin to regard the leading role of the party in the life of the society and its expansion as something obvious or inherited, then this leading role can weaken through errors in policy, in the organization of internal party life or in its leadership of society, a condition which becomes disastrously evident in all areas of social life and creates great dangers for socialism itself. The events of 1956 in Hungary, 1968 in Czechoslovakia, and of 1956 and 1980 in Poland are convincing evidence that this is true.

The leading role of the party must be constantly reasserted in accordance with the objective necessities of its growth and strengthening. The objective of the party is never to lose sight of this vital necessity. It is exceptionally important first of all because the building of socialism and communism in every country presents the party with continually new and ever more complicated tasks which must be dealt with using all available resources, and secondly because the imperialists as their "trained flunkies" and assistants are well aware of the meaning of the leading role of the party and therefore focus all of their attention on undermining the leading role of Marxist-Leninist-type parties in socialist countries. In these efforts they receive considerable assistance from social reformists and revisionists of all hues.

The party can fulfill the role of conscious vanguard of the working class in the struggle for the victory of a socialist revolution, of political leader, of organizer and consciousness raiser of the masses during the period of the building and consolidation of socialism only on the condition that it conduct and manage all its actions according to a single scientific theory of social development--Marxism-Leninism.

Only the mastery of this scientific theory provides the party with a knowledge of the laws of social development, makes it able to analyze correctly specific situations and class interrelationships at any given moment both domestically and in the international arena, permits it to see the future and to establish the proper tactics for any conceivable turn of events, thereby providing all party activities with a high level of authority.

V.I. Lenin, as had K. Marx and F. Engels before him, sneered at everyone who assumed that an undisciplined working class movement would generate socialist consciousness from within; he demanded that scientific socialism be understood as a science, that party members study it and transmit their knowledge to the masses. "We are standing entirely on the soil of Marx's theories, from which we are all gleaning our own views...and which each of us is using in our own forms of struggle and activity."

V.I. Lenin exhorted others to defend only this singularly scientific theory from all kinds of revisionist disfigurement, to preserve the purity of its principles and develop them in all respects so that they would not become removed from life and so that they would correspond to their role as ideological leader of the working class and of all working people. In the development of this theory, the name of Lenin stands beside those of K. Marx and F. Engels.

The study, spreading, and defense of the purity of Marxist-Leninist theory is the basic responsibility of a member of the CPSU. The party is attributing greater and greater significance to ideological work, regarding it as one of the most important aspects of the building of communism. In a speech at the CPSU Central Committee plenum in June 1983, Y.V. Andropov stated that "party committees at all levels and all party organizations must be aware that in addition to the very serious nature of all the other problems they are concerning themselves with (economic, organizational and others), ideological work is assuming more and more of a priority position." It was stated at this forum that "the formation of the consciousness of communists and of all citizens of our socialist society is a matter not only for professional ideologists, propagandists and employees of the mass communications media. It is a matter for the entire party." The CPSU Central Committee plenum established the basic directions for improving the training of cadres in the ideological area, for increasing the sophistication of ideological and theoretical work in the social sciences, particularly in economics, and set forth changes in the style of work of political training organizations. "It is necessary above all to put an end to formalism and to the rote memorization (or reading aloud) of various generalized propositions with no relationship to reality. The objective of political training is for everyone more profoundly to understand party policy under current conditions, so that they can apply previous experiences to their own situations, be more conscious of and actually fulfill their obligations." The plenum also cited the more intense ideological struggle of an international scale: "There is a struggle going on for the hearts and minds of billions of people throughout the world. The future of humanity depends in large part on the outcome of this ideological struggle." A communist, therefore, must be adequately armed theoretically so that he can under any conditions know the truth about this new social order, and be able to oppose imperialist propaganda by exposing its untenable assertions, its deceptiveness and its class objectives.

All Marxist-Leninist parties are concerning themselves with similar issues. Their experiences are confirming that any kind of underestimation of Marxist-Leninist theory, any "narrowly propagandistic understandings of its objectives, any neglect of the basic problems of this theory, any predominance of conjuncturalism or scholastic theorizing carries the threat of serious political and ideological consequences."

Life brings ever newer theoretical problems with which social practice either has not dealt or, if they have been resolved previously, must be dealt with again because of changes in historical circumstances. This requires the concurrent researching of individual theoretical positions which were appropriate to the realities when they were formulated, but which have become obsolete under new conditions. This researching of certain obsolete theses of scientific communism, or the resolution of new social, political or other problems, demands from each Marxist-Leninist party a profound analysis of the current situation based on dialectical materialism, thorough research and a comparison of the experiences of fraternal socialist countries, which are not always identical.

It is obvious that nothing substantial is contributed in this regard by irresponsible, often even naive "innovations" which burst like a soap bubble when they first encounter harsh reality. Just as was the case during the lives of Marx, Engels and Lenin, today as well there are various "new directions" (or more accurately, new attempts at revisionism) in Marxism based on national, regional, or similar foundations, which in actuality are "no more than a new strain of opportunism." The freedom to criticize the basic lessons of Marxist-Leninist teachings, just as it was at the time when Lenin published "What Is To Be Done?", is the same as the freedom to introduce into socialism bourgeois thoughts and bourgeois elements.

In conclusion, it may be stated that the assurance of the leading role of the party in the life of society and its increase at all developmental levels of socialism depends on the party being able, in all its activities, to manage itself unconditionally according to Marxist-Leninist theory, to maintain the purity of its foundations and to develop this theory in close conjunction with the requirements of social progress.

A principal task of the party in fulfilling its leading role is the formulation of a general strategy of development which includes all areas of social life. The correctness of party policy is the most important condition for the growth of its role and its authority within society.

A policy is proper which is realistic both in its estimation of the level of development that has been achieved and of the requirements for resolving the most pressing problems. "Perceiving the facts just as they are, understanding the complexity and contradictoriness of the phenomena of social life, neither exaggerating nor underestimating what has been accomplished previously, are the basic conditions for a scientifically based policy."

The policy of the ruling party, which encompasses and reflects the most important factors in social development--economic, social, national demographic and nationality, and international--represents a force uniting all strata of people for the satisfaction of their material and spiritual needs, which is the objective of party activity. Its exceptional qualities include honesty and openness. The communist party speaks openly about which economic, social and other tasks can be resolved by a certain deadline and which ones must wait until the preconditions have been formed for their fulfillment. This develops trust in the party and increases its social importance. On the other hand, if words and deeds diverge, then the unfulfilled announcements serve to weaken the position of the party.

In its first program, the Leninist party came out for the first time in the history of the working class movement with the concept of the victory of a dictatorship of the proletariat as a necessary condition for the socialist transformation of society. It also was the first to announce that the working class wanted to represent the interests of all workers, assume the role of their leader, and considered nonproletarian elements as its allies in the struggle against all forms of oppression. The program and policy of the Bolshevik Party on agrarian and nationality issues contributed to the winning over by the proletariat of independent small farmers and workers of the non-Russian peoples and nations as allies in all stages of the revolution.



Nevertheless, when the Bolsheviks entered into alliances and coalitions with other political parties to achieve concrete advantages for workers they never forsook their principles, precisely outlined the conditions, objectives and deadlines for such agreements, were meticulous in retaining their independence, and took seriously their role as the organizers of all revolutionary forces. When, after the victory of socialism, the Bolsheviks offered to the leftist Esers the formation of a ruling coalition, the party announced through Lenin himself that this bloc would be the expression of an alliance between workers and farmers. "This is an honorable coalition, an honorable union, but this union will be an honorable coalition at the top as well among the leaders, among the leftist Esers and the Bolsheviks, only if the leftist Esers more convincingly express their convictions that the revolution we are living through is a socialist revolution."

The governing coalition of communists and democratic political parties in Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Poland and Bulgaria have existed on the condition that the partners of the communists acknowledge the hegemony of the working class in the revolution and its leading role in the building of socialism and in the life of society, and that they support the policy of the communist party, which is oriented to the building of socialism. When the conditions of this alliance have been disrupted, political difficulties have developed and socialist construction has been retarded.

A proper, scientifically based policy representing the interests of all strata and groups of workers and decisively supporting development directed at the formation of a socially just society with prospects for full social equality, communism is the guarantor of ongoing growth in the leading role of the party. The founders of scientific socialism considered unity of thoughts and deeds to be an absolutely essential condition of success. Such unity is still more essential to a party when it comes to power and when it leads a society during the period of socialist construction. In the same vein, when V.I. Lenin began the formation of a party of the new type, he considered it absolutely essential to form it from people of completely identical ideological persuasion, and considered thoughts of ideological "pluralism" in a proletarian party to be unacceptable.

Ideological unity presumes a kind of Marxist-Leninist unity of opinion on issues of principle in the class struggle and the building of a new socialist society which forms within this party a union of like-minded people. An organization without ideological unity would resemble an army setting out on a march without an idea of where and why it should go. "Organization without an ideological focus is foolishness which in practice transforms workers into the pitiful lackeys of the bourgeoisie which has the power." This Leninist idea has retained its relevance even today, when in the USSR there has not been a bourgeoisie for a long time now, or exploiters, and when the front of the class struggle has moved to the international stage.

The above-mentioned thought of V.I. Lenin is still relevant at a higher level in the developed capitalist countries, where the bourgeoisie is attempting with all its resources to fragment the ideological unity of communist parties, a

task in which they are displaying great inventiveness, and also in those socialist countries where the socialist transformation of society is not yet complete (such as the People's Republic of Poland), where a sharp class struggle both below the surface and in the open still persists. These class conflicts are always provoked from outside by the imperialists, who are displaying a high degree of unity in this dirty activity, and the ability to learn from their previous mistakes.

Ideological unity alone, however, is not sufficient for the party. It is necessary unconditionally to strengthen organizational unity, an activity requiring precisely defined and binding norms for all communists. Without these the party would resemble an army without a headquarters, without the ability to take battle positions or even to form a marching column. Democratic centralism, which V.I. Lenin developed as the basic organizational principle of the party, has been adopted by all Marxist-Leninist parties. Revisionists of all hues have conducted and continue to conduct vicious attacks on these principles, and especially against the necessity for the minority to subordinate itself to the majority and for the decisions of higher organs to be binding on their subordinate organs.

The Leninist principle in no way implies that there cannot exist differing views on certain issues. Lenin and the entire party always fought for the development of initiative and activity of party organizations and all communists in evaluating all issues of party life and policy: "Only he who attentively studies, thinks through and deals independently with the issues and fate of his party...is worthy of the name party member." If, however, certain issues before the party organizations or the entire party have been discussed and decisions adopted, then discussion ends, work begins and all communists work as one person. Otherwise it is impossible to speak of party discipline or of any kind of organizational activity by the party, and absolutely not about its leading role in the building of communism and in the entire life of society.

The CPSU, just as other Marxist-Leninist parties, governs itself by the Leninist thought: "The party is a voluntary union which will necessarily fall apart, first ideologically, but then also materially, if it does not rid itself of members who express antiparty views. The boundary between party and anti-party is determined by the party program, tactical resolutions of the party, and by its bylaws."

The historical experiences of the communist and working class movement proves that any kind of disruption of the ideological and organizational unity of the party of the working class at any stage at all of the struggle for socialism threatens communism with losses and even defeats. The Bolshevik Party well recognized the mortal danger for the building of socialism that was represented by vacillation in the ranks of the ruling vanguard of the working class, which was surrounded by a mass of small property owners and which was threatened with infection by petty bourgeois ideals and traditions. The 10th CPSU Congress therefore adopted a resolution conceived by Lenin on party unity which forbade any kind of factional activity and obligated the Central Committee to expel factionalists from the party without regard for their functions or previous achievements.

The social basis of opportunism disappears after the full victory of socialism. But even in these conditions the party is not protected against infiltration by irresolute people who understand the contradictions of socialism unidimensionally, condemn socialism and come under the influence of antisocialist influences. It is in anticipation of this that the statutes include guarantees against all manifestations of factionalism.

This unbreakable ideological and organizational unity of the party represents the main source of its invincibility, the essential condition of the growth of its leading role in society which builds and advances socialism and proceeds onward to communism.

For the sophistication of the leading party in the management of the economic, social and ideological affairs of society to increase it is necessary, even in view of all the great successes which have already been achieved, that the party not submit to self-satisfaction, that it train its cadres not to be satisfied with what has been achieved, but to be prepared to analyze their activities critically. These principles apply equally to the entire party and to individual communists.

F. Engels wrote: "In every revolution, just as elsewhere, many foolish actions necessarily take place, and when there is finally enough peace and quiet to take a critical view of things the following conclusion is necessarily reached: that we have done some things that would have been better left undone and that there are a few things that were not done that should have been, and this is why things did not work out." Every party which is in power in socialist countries can, despite all of its undoubted successes, find underutilized reserves in its work and remind itself of its errors and omissions. These are not terrible as long as the party does not attempt to cover them up and bravely faces and corrects them at the proper time. The admission and correction of its own mistakes does not damage the image of a party; quite the contrary, it strengthens its authority and fortifies trust in the party.

Any kind of haughtiness, complacency, or bragging, any reluctance openly to admit mistakes and shortcomings (so as to be able to find their causes and take immediate steps to correct them) is capable of placing some members outside of its ranks, weakening the leading role of the party and its authority among the masses. No communist, no basic organization or committee is incapable of making mistakes. "The attitude of a political party to its own mistakes is one of the most important and most accurate yardsticks of how seriously that party takes its mission and of how it fulfills its practical obligations to its own class and to the working masses. The open admission of errors, the uncovering of their causes, analysis of the situation which caused them, and careful consideration of ways to correct them are all characteristics of a party which takes its mission seriously, and is a sign that the party is carrying out its responsibilities, which is the training and education of a class and then the masses.

All experiences of our party and of all our fraternal parties confirm that without an attentive, critical analysis of what has already been done, what has remained undone or forgotten about in haste, it is impossible to move ahead in

theory, in policy or in the building of the economy. Criticism and self-criticism have already been components for a long time of the basic rights and responsibilities of communists. The 26th CPSU Congress emphasized the necessity for "cultivating in all party organizations a spirit of self-criticism and intolerance of shortcomings."

The development of criticism and self-criticism in basic organizations which operate right in the midst of work collectives merits special attention. The best technique for strengthening comradely relations is the creation of a situation where a public, rigorous and well-intentioned evaluation of the activities of any of the members of the organization, criticism for instance even of the director of the enterprise or a minister by a rank and file worker, will be a normal occurrence, the norm of the life of the enterprise. This is desirable because in a situation of healthy satisfaction neither original viewpoints nor attempts seriously to penetrate to the core of problems and to work out a collective solution to them can arise. "The more boldly and concretely communists proceed in the evaluation of the current issues in the life of the party and the entire country, the more actively they participate in the fulfillment of adopted resolutions, the more successful our party will be in fulfilling its historical mission."

Criticism is a sharp weapon and one must be able to wield it properly. It must represent an organic combination of rigorousness and respect for human dignity (insofar as the person has not lost this previously) in such a way that it becomes a display of reasoned concern for the correction of shortcomings in improving work performance.

The right to criticize represents, in Lenin's words, the freedom of criticism, complete and all-encompassing, to the extent that it does not disrupt the unity of a specific project and the unacceptability of any kind of criticism which undermines or makes more difficult the unity of a project on which the party has agreed.

In an attempt to foster criticism and self-criticism, the CPSU has come out against "criticism for criticism's sake," against pure slander, denigration, against a nihilistic attitude to everything that has been achieved and fought for with painstaking work.

A Marxist-Leninist party advances the growth of its leading role in the life of society also by virtue of the fact that it is a party of internationalists. In its activities it links dedicated service to the interests of the working people in its own country with a like commitment to the matter of the liberation of workers throughout the world. This characteristic strengthens the faith of workers of all nationalities in the party and increases its moral and political authority.

The founders of scientific socialism, K. Marx and F. Engels, discovered the objective foundation of the international character of the communist and working class movement, which is the unity of the class interests of its national divisions, the unity of their class objectives and the unity of the forces arrayed against them.



K. Marx noted that "if that fraternal bond which should link the workers of various countries and stimulate them to stand firmly together in all struggles for liberation is neglected, then their nonunified efforts will be met with a common lack of success." F. Engels elaborated on this thought by stating that "in the workers movement there are truly national thoughts...always accompanied by truly international thoughts." The founders of scientific socialism proclaimed the immortal slogan "Workers of all countries of the world, unite!" and fought their entire lives for its realization.

V.I. Lenin trained the working class in the spirit of the ideas of Marx and Engels so that in the struggle for the realization of their class objectives and interests they would exclude national chauvinism, isolationism and selfishness, so that they would subordinate their narrowly nationalist interests to common ones. V.I. Lenin called nationalism a worldview foreign to the proletariat and inimical to the revolutionary struggle because "with its tactics of division and fragmentation it completely disrupts the great mandate of the merger and unification of proletarians of all nations, all races, all languages."

A Leninist party founded on internationalist principles united the working class of multinational Russia. It was active in all areas of this immense country, the inhabitants of which not only spoke different languages and recognized all the major religions, but which also at the same time were at different stages of socioeconomic and cultural development and belonged to various socioeconomic formations, including primitive communal settlements. If they had been left to themselves many would not have had the strength to advance to a higher level of civilization. If, then, in a historically short period all the peoples of the Soviet Union have reached socialism simultaneously, with many of them bypassing one and even two socioeconomic formations, then this is a result of the nationality policy of the party, its struggle for the liberation of all peoples so that they may form their own state, and for the full equality of all nations and nationalities.

The unexpectedly rapid advance of the economies and cultures of previously backward peoples has occurred because when studying the specific nationality and historical characteristics of various parts of the country the party did not forget about the general interests which do not divide but rather unite workers of all nationalities: their desire for freedom, independence, social justice, and did not forget the interest in uniting the forces of all people in the struggle for a better future, for socialism.

There is no sillier or more false assertion than that being spread by bourgeois ideologists and politicians in conjunction with revisionists, namely that the Soviet communists have refused to respect the national or other characteristics of various countries and have required all communist parties to operate according to their model.

V.I. Lenin taught, and all Marxist-Leninist parties subscribe to this view, that the ability to manage revolutionary changes in society implemented by the working class consists of the ability to adapt the generally valid principles of Marxism to the concrete conditions of each country. In practice there does

not exist a single country in Europe, Asia or in America where a revolution and the process of socialist changes would be a mechanical repetition of foreign models. This is clearly known to the authors of the above-mentioned lies, who, however, have another more specific objective: under the guise of national characteristics, they intend to contribute to the infiltration into communist parties of views related to national specificity, thereby turning them away from Marxist-Leninist internationalist principles.

The CPSU considers itself to be an inseparable component of the worldwide army of communists. The successes and failures of revolutionary liberation struggles and the efforts of those trying to build social systems in whatever country have always been close to its heart. The CPSU has devoted and continues to devote particular attention to the activities of countries of the socialist community. The Soviet Union, which so far has come the longest way towards communist construction, has been fulfilling the role of pioneer. It has always provided fraternal nations with all possible economic, political and moral assistance, and with all its strength has helped them to defend themselves against attempts at armed aggression from imperialists. It has accomplished this in spite of persistent attacks by imperialism, beginning with the intervention and civil war in 1917-1922, an economic blockade, ongoing provocations including attacks on the USSR by fascist Germany and militaristic Japan, the postwar policy of "containment" and "reflection," an economic boycott and other unfriendly actions by the USA, attempting to retard the development of the Soviet state and cause it the most possible damage, misfortune and economic difficulties.

A similar policy of the forces of imperialism is that of defending a way of life that is ending. V.I. Lenin wrote the following about the first such attempts: "They have not overthrown the new order created by revolution, but nor have they permitted it immediately to take the kind of forward steps that would confirm the correctness of the predictions of socialists and make it possible for them very rapidly to advance the forces of production and develop all of those possibilities which would enhance socialism, thereby clearly proving to the entire world that socialism contains within itself immense forces and that humanity has now embarked upon a new stage of development holding uncommonly excellent possibilities." A similar objective is being pursued by the policy of the current representatives of the USA, which is bringing arms factories, sanctions and provocations of all types to bear on the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community.

In terms of internal development, the most valuable and unforgettable parts are the very rich and comprehensive experiences from the building of a society of this new type which the CPSU, the Soviet people and its state are trying to pass on to all fighters for socialism. At the first all-Russian Congress of the national economic council, which met at the time when the Soviet Union was taking the first actual, nontheoretical steps toward socialism, V.I. Lenin announced that "these experiences will not be forgotten...no matter how difficult the changes of the Russian revolution may have been, they cannot be taken away from the workers. They have gone down in history as an achievement of socialism, and on the basis of these experiences the international revolution will build its socialist edifice in the future."

At present the experiences of the USSR are being enriched by those of other socialist countries. "These experiences show how complex are the problems which arise on the way to socialist construction. They also attest to the fact that only socialism is able to resolve the most complex issues of social life."

The internationalist policy of the CPSU, its struggle for freedom and independence, for social progress of all large and small peoples, its untiring struggle for peace and against those who promote war, strengthens the authority of the party throughout the world and within the country. This is the more so because peace is not only the best guarantee of prosperity, but in the thermo-nuclear era also of the very existence of humanity.

The party can assure the growth of its leading role only on the condition that it never forgets that the people are the makers of history. It is not the party but the people under its leadership who consummate the revolution and build a new society. The people, however, are not made up solely of workers. As early as 1864 K. Marx noted that "one element of success is in the hands of the working class, their numbers: but numbers count only when they are linked by organization and led by awareness." A Marxist-Leninist party provides both of these to the working class and the masses. That is, if the party truly deepens its links with the masses, lives their concerns and needs, then its strength will grow and its role in social life. The creative abilities and strength of the people will then grow under the leadership of a Marxist-Leninist party. The party, however, does not gain the trust of the masses forever. One cannot assume, for instance, that in conjunction with successes in the building of socialism a socialist worldview will be victorious and take root forever in all workers, or that they will take it as a given. The consciousness and convictions of workers are formed through the interaction of many factors, internal and external influences, and ideological influences both from communists and from the foreign enemies of socialism. Every new generation encounters the problem of attaining a socialist consciousness, which is not a part of the genetic code.

Therefore, V.I. Lenin taught that the party must, at all stages of the building of socialism "soberly monitor the actual state of the consciousness and preparedness of the entire class (not only its communist vanguard) and of the entirety of the working masses (and not only its conscious members)." This is possible only when the party lives at the same pace as the masses, knows their moods perfectly and their level of readiness to understand and accept as their own this or that slogan proclaimed by the party.

Workers will listen to party recommendations only if they correspond to their own basic interests, and only if party policy has learned its lessons from its victories and defeats, if the masses are convinced of the firmness and consistency of the political strategy of the party, of its readiness to make any necessary sacrifices in the name of implementing it, and if they are convinced that the words of the party are not at variance with its deeds.

The party cannot play with the masses, painting in bright colors pictures of a pretty future which perhaps will arrive in and of itself solely through the activity of objective laws of social development. The reality of socialism and communism is an ongoing one only when the masses, led by the communist party, realize that it is a creation of their own hands, intelligence and will.

This is also the essence of the development of socialist democracy in all spheres of social activity with which the CPSU and other fraternal parties are concerned, through stimulating worker initiative and the activities of state organs and social organizations, primarily the soviets, unions and youth union.

The CPSU does not perceive the essence and content of Soviet democracy in terms of formal projects, but in the actual engagement of the largest number of people in the firm and decisive management of the country and the life of society in such a way that all activities of the political system point to the improvement of developed socialism and to the building of communism. The party slogan is everything for the individual. The party explains to the masses that the implementation of this slogan can result only from conscious, organized and purposeful actions by all worker organizations and each individual.

The June 1983 CPSU Central Committee plenum also turned its attention to the important question of actual popular government: "We must declare a real war on those practices in which our democratic standards and principles are not backed up by deeds, where only their formal aspect is satisfied, where there are only appearances. Of what use, for example, is a meeting if, as often happens, it is conducted basically according to a prepared scenario, if there is an absence of an open and motivated discussion of issues, if the contributions of discussion participants have been edited beforehand and if initiative, and particularly criticism, is suppressed and managed? And of what value is the work of union organizations which do not have the courage to speak up in defense of the interests of workers or against various conflicts in production? Or what is the purpose of popular controllers if no attention is paid to their warnings and if necessary measures are not implemented?"

The USSR Constitution guarantees broad rights to every individual and work collective, organizations and worker associations. The level at which these are utilized, of worker participation in the management of society, is limited solely by society's material possibilities and the level of political consciousness of the masses.

Bourgeois ideologists and revisionists who attack the thesis of the growing significance of the leading role of a party of the Marxist-Leninist type (the issue of the leading role of the party has long stood in the middle of the struggle of Marxists with bourgeois ideologists and their revisionist allies) present this issue to trusting people in such a way that strengthening the leading role of the party in socialist countries comes off as an attack on democracy and human freedom. Their presentations of proof consist of citing, as examples of illegality, the sentencing of those who have been convicted of espionage or anti-state activity, even though this has transpired on the basis of principles approved by the people and included in the constitution. The issue of democracy cannot be confused with that of anarchistic capriciousness. Leadership of the masses by the communist party not only does not limit the initiative, independence and rights of all workers, but directly supports their continuous development and expansion.



Strengthening the bond with the masses requires a working style on the part of the party, its committees, organizations and by all communists in which they speak seriously and openly with people, do not avoid delicate issues and assist in developing the political culture of the workers: they must take pains to see to it that every person is not only a conscientious and honest worker, but also a conscious participant in social life.

The basis of the entire issue of the role of a Marxist-Leninist party in the political system of a socialist society is in the end reduced to the issue of the bond between the party and the masses, the ability and skill of the party at organizing, training and politically directing the conscious activity of the masses. Lenin's thought will never grow old: "The more difficult, the greater, the more responsible the new historical role, the greater the number of people that must be recruited, millions for independent participation in the solution of these tasks."

As the core of the political system of Soviet society, the CPSU provides everyone with an example through the democratic organization of all aspects of its life. The party creates and develops democratic principles which penetrate into all spheres of socialist life. This represents "one of the most important manifestations of the leading role of the party in the life of society, of its inspirational influence on the masses."

In developing the founding ideas of K. Marx and F. Engels, V.I. Lenin taught that the communist party is a component of the working class, its vanguard, moving at the head of this class and accepting the first, most severe blows of the enemy, pulling behind it the working class and its allies, and that following the socialist revolution the party is the "direct leading vanguard of the proletariat." The party guards this position in society and strengthens it through meticulous regulation of its ranks.

Even under the conditions of harsh "natural" selection in the period of tsarism, when membership in the Bolshevik Party meant a fierce struggle fraught with the danger imprisonment, forced labor and even the death penalty, V.I. Lenin expressed the following thought: "I would rather that 10 people who are working are not called party members (real workers do not care about titles), than that a single gossip have the right to be a party member."

After the October Revolution, V.I. Lenin warned that various careerists, hustlers, and others with no strong communist convictions would attempt to associate themselves with the ruling party, and that they would be capable of bringing petty bourgeois influences into the party. Purging itself of foreign influences becomes a daily concern of the party, of each of its organizations. The party can be a leader of the working class "if it is truly a vanguard of a revolutionary class, if it brings together all its best members, and if it is made up exclusively of conscious and committed communists, trained and toughened by experiences gained in unrelenting revolutionary struggle."

Prior to the victory in the October Revolution, workers made up the following percentages of the party: prior to 1905--58.6 percent; 1905-1916--64.5 percent; 1917--63.8 percent. On 7 November 1917, the day of the victory in the October Revolution,

the menshevik newspaper NOVAYA ZHIZN published an article by V. Bazarov entitled "Where Is the Strength of the Bolsheviks?" in which the author admitted that "the core of the Bolshevik Party is constituted by the flower of the Russian working class, its most conscious, organized, committed and creative talents."

Purely formal membership in the working class, particularly since members of other social strata may enter it, cannot yet be sufficient for acceptance into the communist party. V.I. Lenin considered it essential "that if we do not wish to disappoint ourselves and others, then we have to define a worker so as to include only those who have truly mastered a proletarian psychology through their position in life." This Leninist requirement has not lost its force even today, when all classes and social groups of Soviet society have shifted to the class position of the working class and the party of the working class has become the vanguard of all the Soviet people. It is particularly important to adhere to this principle in those countries where there still exist the conflicts of a transitional phase and where, because of the rapid development of industry, a majority or a significant portion of the members of the working class are first generation workers who have only recently come from other social strata.

The fact that the ranks of the party include people who are worthy of this, members of the working class committed to the idea of communism, along with collective farmers and members of the intelligentsia, and that these ranks are supplemented with active builders of communism, the best of all categories of workers, is a guarantee that the party will fulfill its historic task.

The CPSU monitors the party ranks so strictly to assure that people do not join the party for their own benefit but in the interest of committed work and the advance of communism.

It struggles decisively against a compromising attitude towards those who disrupt party statutes and the standards of party life, and applies much stricter standards to party members than to nonparty members. A communist must be the foremost worker of communist construction. In any collective he is the representative of the party and interprets its policy not only by words, but in the first place by deeds, personal example in his work, in social life, in political activity and in lifestyle.

Communists always stand out. This is especially important in a work collective where communists work side by side with nonparty members. Here it is evident how principled communists are in the struggle with various antisocial phenomena, how they behave towards sloppiness and irresponsibility in work, towards falsification and the hiding of shortcomings from managers, how demanding they are of themselves and of their comrades, how they refuse to compromise with manifestations of egoism and petty bourgeois attitudes, with greed, drunkenness and other types of the disruption of discipline and the legal order, and towards indifference towards the concerns and work of other people.

The nonparty worker often judges the party as a whole by various manifestations of internal party relationships, by the behavior of individual communists in various actual situations. Daily perceptions emphasized by convincing examples contained both in newspapers and real life can become a prejudice which can be overcome only with difficulty and through advanced lectures, meetings and discussions.

Such perceptions severely undermine the authority of basic organizations, thereby indirectly casting a shadow on the entire party. These include cases of the misuse of state or social property or of one's position. Y.V. Andropov characterized them at the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee plenum as "the undermining of the very foundations of our state administration." At a meeting with old party members in August of this year he emphasized that it is necessary to be concerned not only with the ideological assurance of the economy, but also with the economic, and in the broader sense of the word the social assurance of ideological work. "After all, any kind of disorder, poor management, violation of laws, greed or bribery devalues the work of thousands of agitators and propagandists."

The high degree of moral responsibility which every communist must possess is an essential condition for the maintenance and increase of authority and ideological influence on the masses which the party has already attained. Without the trust and support of the masses of workers the successful implementation of the leading role of the party in society is unthinkable.

The resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the Second Congress of the SDDSR underscore the differences in principle between the Bolshevik Party and the revolutionary activities of the incompetent parties of the Second International: "The characteristic features and properties of this party of the new type, which it possessed from the moment of its conception and which crystallized in the process of further development, consist of the following:

- the party is led by Marxist-Leninist teachings and develops these in a creative fashion, assuring an organic unity between revolutionary theory and revolutionary practice;

- the party is a collective of political leaders of the working class, the highest form of its organization and the vanguard of all workers; the source of its inexhaustible strength is the tightest possible links with the masses;

- it is a party that develops its activity on the basis of democratic centralism, continually strengthening the ideological and organizational unity of its ranks, developing the conscious discipline and activity of party members;

- it is a party that does not compromise with any kind of factionalism, forming of cliques, or displays of revisionism, opportunism and dogmatism;

- it critically analyzes the results of its revolutionary transformational activities and policies, and continually studies, evaluates and utilizes the experiences gained by the international communist movement;

- it applies consistently the principles of proletarian internationalism.

If we are to formulate the shortest possible answer to the question "How do we assure the growth of the leading role of the party?", we would reach the following conclusion: Defend and develop in all possible directions those features and characteristics which are typical of Marxist-Leninist parties; monitor the correctness of political strategy, because any deviations in policy are paid for dearly; assure a leading role for communists in all areas of activity, be sure of their high communist ideals, their commitment and energy, their personal example at work, in social life and in the moral sphere.

In this way an increase in the leading role of the Marxist-Leninist party in the life of society will become not only objectively necessary, but also a managed process. And its management is entrusted to the party.

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## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

### NO REVISIONARY POLICIES SEEN IN BUDAPEST'S MINORITY POLICIES

Munich SUDOST EUROPA in German No 1, 1984 pp 1-14

[Text of lecture by Gerhard Seewann held on 15 November 1983 at the conference of the Institute for East and South European History, Munich University, and of the research group for cultural and religious history in Eastern Europe on topical nationality problems in that region: "Minority Questions Looked at from Budapest--Hungary's Nationalities--Magyar Minorities"]

[Text] The significance of the nationality problem for the state and society in today's Hungary is highlighted by the fact that of the total of 20 counties in the country there is only one without settlements of nationalities. It is therefore virtually impossible to ignore the existence of national minorities. On the other hand, their proportion of between 4 and 5 percent of the total population is so small that the ethnic Hungarians can hardly any longer feel them to be a threat to their own ethnic identity. This, in contrast to the periods not long ago when there were movements of national awakening and state formations and the Magyar group felt challenged into a bitter struggle for its majority in historic Hungary and could conceive of nationality policy only as an instrument for that struggle. That era actually only ended in 1944/45.

#### The Postwar Period

In the years of Hungarian reconstruction, 1944-1948, the fairly uneven conditions of the nationalities and the extremely unsure government attitude toward them fall under fairly heterogeneous determinants:

1. A massive external and internal pressure toward evicting Hungaro-Germans and exchanging Hungaro-Slovaks for Slovak-Magyars;
2. a resolute and partly successful resistance against such tendencies by the ethnic groups affected;
3. differing public assessments of the political role and rating of the nationalities against the background of events and frontlines in preceding war years; and
4. parallel differences even within the Communist Party, the Moscow wing of which, around Rakosi, pursued a policy of "divide and conquer," but the indigenous wing, around Rajk and Kadar, tended to draw the nationalities into communist party alliance policy.

Developments until 1956 may be summarized by saying the various nationalities were treated unevenly, with surprising changes in that respect occurring within that period, too. For instance, in 1948, when Tito broke with Stalin, the

very active South Slav minority lost the privileged status it had been given as a democratic group. From its nationwide persecution starting at that time, the nationality associations of the Hungaro-Romanians and Hungaro-Slovaks, founded in 1948 and 1949, profited, in turn. The Hungaro-Germans, banned as fascists and pushed completely off the board, politically and socially, made the taillight.

In the months during the fall of 1956, the ethnic population did not expose itself in any way politically and hardly took part in the escape movement after the defeat of the insurrection. This allegiance to the Hungarian state, deeply rooted in the tradition of all Hungarian ethnic groups and manifesting itself once again, in turn, facilitated the step in 1958, under Janos Kadar's party and state leadership, toward a liberal ethnic alliance policy including broad population strata.

#### Guideline Resolutions of 1958

The Politburo resolutions of 7 October 1958 mark an important turning point in Hungary's ethnic policy since 1945. For the first time the party executive charged all party and state organs as well as the meanwhile reactivated nationality associations with actively promoting ethnic affairs, especially with cultivating and preserving the vernacular culture. That far exceeded the principle of equality already on the statutes. Fostering vernacular culture was then also written as a collective right of the ethnic groups into the thoroughly revised Constitution of 1972.

Surprisingly, these guideline resolutions of 1958 took no concrete shape in the practical politics of the subsequent decade; instead, instruction in the vernacular for the ethnic groups deteriorated drastically in that very period although the 1961 instruction law had made its introduction for groups of at least 15 children mandatory. Three factors caused this negative development:

1. The nationality associations found no actually competent institutions, or such as would feel to be competent, to talk to in the state apparatus. Thus the representation and settlement of interests were completely inadequately handled. Symptomatic for that was the abolition of the nationality department in the ministry of culture in 1967, after that department had to hand over its competencies to the commissions even before, in 1962.
2. The political consolidation of the system and the radical reorganization of agriculture became priorities for the regional and local authorities which, to be sure, had in addition be charged with the main responsibility for implementing the 1958 resolutions referred to, but evidently could not or would not address themselves to them. Those authorities, furthermore, had to feel backing for their course when the party started to propagate with emphasis the denationalization and depolitification of public life. The contradiction suggested here right there points to what is perhaps the most important third reason for a development that thus ran against the 1958 resolutions:
3. Up to the second half of the 1960's there prevailed the uncontroverted view in party and government circles that "under the conditions of socialism, the nationality question would settle itself and automatically among us as well as

among our neighbors," i.e., as soon as the socialist setup in the state, the economy and the society would reach a state of development causing such automatism. For that reason one paid as little attention to the nationalities and their concerns domestically as to the Hungarian ethnic groups beyond the national borders. Especially the pervasive changes in rural living conditions, highly beneficial to so-called "natural assimilation," on the surface seemed to bear out the adherents to that automatism theory.

#### 1968: Turning Point in the Nationality Policy

Not until 1968 did the turning point in the Hungarian nationality policy actually come. In the fall of that year, the top leadership, once and for all dropped the automatism theory and gradually began to create the institutional web needed for bringing the nationality policy concept to realization. The promotion of the culture and languages of the nationalities, which then in fact started most effectively, went together with the evident hope and expectation that, in conformity with the mutuality principle, Hungarian minorities in the neighboring states should receive equal promotion, which would include their relations with their motherland. György Aczel, prominent then as today in Hungarian cultural policy, provided the following programmatic formula for the efforts starting at that time and increasing further in the 1970's:

"The historic conditions for the relations between Hungarian groups in Carpatho-Ukraine, the CSSR, Romania and Yugoslavia and our fatherland are crucially different today from what they were before the liberation. The change of conditions is basically determined by that in the neighboring countries as well as among us socialism is being constructed and our political interests essentially run in the same direction as theirs.

"We think it natural for the Slovak, Romanian, Serbian, Croatian and German nationalities in our country to cultivate their relations with their brothers and sisters in the CSSR, Romania, Yugoslavia and so forth, not only on the basis of the broader community of principle, but of the linguistic community as well. Equally so, we seek to cultivate our relations with the Magyar groups in neighboring socialist countries, generally through exchange in intellectual matters. This specific cultural mission takes it as a matter of principle that the culture of the Hungarian national minorities in the neighboring socialist countries is not only part of the spiritual life of any of these countries, but also of general Hungarian culture. In our people's state we see to it that the nationalities living in it enjoy absolute equality, not only by the letter of the law, but in accordance with the spirit of our society. Under the conditions of common socialist construction, the nationalities should transmit the values and culture of the peoples in the Danube Basin; their historic mission is that of a 'socialist spiritual mediator' in Central Europe."\*

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\*Aczel György in April 1968, quoted here from KRITIKA, No 8, 1981, p 4. In his opening speech to the national conference for propaganda, agitation and educational policy on 11 January 1983, Aczel reiterated that view as follows: "We look at the nationalities in Hungary and the people of Hungarian nationality living in the neighboring countries as communities that under many sorts

Between 1968 and today a school system has been created that largely conforms to the settlement structure of the nationalities, embraces all educational levels and is bilingual in its thrust. Also created was an extensive network of cultural leisure time facilities such as houses of culture, clubs, associations, libraries, books and magazines, radio and TV programs, facilities and events that chiefly serve the fostering of minority cultures, for which considerable financial means are allocated. In parallel with it there has developed, especially since 1975, minority research embracing various disciplines (language, ethnography, history, sociology, demography), providing a broader scientific basis for the official efforts.

### Problems in the Nationality Policy

Why then does such a nationality policy nevertheless run into considerable and immense difficulties? And this, less on the output than on the feedback side, i.e., what the state apparatus has made available is being used less than what would conform to actual demographic proportions, so that needs must first be propagated and aroused artificially, from the top.

Here the following has to be taken into account:

Nationality culture in Hungary was almost exclusively agrarian culture. Among the perplexities or paradoxes of Hungarian nationality policy one would have to consider that the efforts to foster and further minority cultures starts at the very moment that the minorities themselves threaten to disappear or their cultures are about to become museum-like, deprived of real life, as a consequence of the pervasive sociocultural change in, particularly, the rural areas.

In those areas, after all, up to 1945, i.e. up to not much more than one generation ago, more or less feudal conditions predominated, which elsewhere had been surmounted already since the turn of the century or after 1918. It is perfectly in line with this fundamental change process toward a homogenized industrial society for the Hungarian nationality policy to summarize these problems through the conceptual polarity between integration and assimilation: This integration proceeding within the general context of socioeconomic structural change, which at once also means an integration into the socialist economy and society, is to be encouraged, while assimilation is to be prevented because being merged within national culture would mean a surrender of the specific minority cultures and the bilingualism that goes with them. Suddenly they discovered that such a development would be a cultural pauperization, a threat to the newly appreciated variety and also to the pragmatically valued bilingualism of any ethnic group.

By way of summary one may say: The state's forcible cultivation of needs in promoting minority cultures, which are actually none but rudimentary any longer,

of aspects, principally under the cultural aspect, could play the role of a bridge, an inspiring role among the various countries. We think economic, political and cultural cooperation with the neighboring socialist countries could also help settle the nationality problem." NEPSZABADSAG, 15 January 1983, p 5.



ad se already points beyond internal Hungarian conditions. Or, in other words: The specific situation of the Hungarian ethnic groups or the official nationality policy permits the inference that their initiators are not, or even less, concerned to satisfy domestic needs that hardly exist any longer, but rather, to contribute through their exemplary stance and political activity to satisfying cultural needs of the Hungarian ethnic groups beyond the national frontiers.

#### Hungary's Nationalities--Magyar Minorities

This raises the question about the reciprocity of the Hungarian nationality policy and its chances and limits.

This question shall be answered by comparing the objective and subjective conditions for existence for the Hungarian ethnic groups in neighboring countries and the nationalities in Hungary. Common features are rather formal there, yet the differences are mainly qualitative in nature. Among the common features is the socialist social system, the equality, on a constitutional basis--at least on paper--and the belonging together in an area divided, to be sure, by national frontiers and yet geographically integrated which has, furthermore, a common, if diversely interpreted, history. Significant differences, however, exist in the settlement, social and denominational structure, in cultural development and, finally, in historic and national awareness.

1. The territorially contiguous settlement areas of the Hungarian ethnic groups, concentrated essentially along the Hungarian frontier, are much more closed structures with unequivocal majority proportions than the Hungarian nationalities that live dispersed across the whole country, isolated from one another, mostly surrounded by Hungarian environments, and in mixed settlements.
2. In contrast to the Hungarian nationalities, primarily rooted in an agrarian milieu, the Hungarian ethnic groups have a more differentiated and also an urban social structure in which the intelligentsia holds a firm place. This may also have something to do, among other things, with the highly diverse readiness or inclination for assimilation of the two population groups compared here, which is likely to be much higher in Hungary.
3. The Hungarian nationalities are denominationally very heterogeneous, even within the various ethnic groups, split up into various religious communities. The Hungarian ethnic groups, on the other hand, show a much more uniform denominational structure, Transylvania alone being split between Catholics and Protestants. Moreover, their churches in two cases are of a national character in that they, in Romania and Yugoslavia, are confronted with the orthodox church of the two national peoples that may also have something to do with the surprising and less known fact that the Hungarians' church membership in Transylvania, at 85 percent, is, after Poland, the highest proportion in any East European country.
4. The Hungarian nationalities have been isolated for centuries from their motherlands as well as within their own ethnic groups and are living lives oriented to local traditions, showing up in a great variety of dialects. In

part, communication with the literary idiom of their mother tongue has so much already been lost that there are serious communication difficulties. This fact then greatly favors the linguistic assimilation, especially of the young generation within the nationalities, to Magyar.

The Hungarian ethnic groups in neighboring countries, by contrast, despite their obstacles, keep vivid contact with the culture of their motherland which, after all, was undivided till 1918 and still is. That now has to do with the fifth and probably most important difference between the two population groups, a very differently structured national and historic consciousness. Because of traditions that are looking back for centuries of an ethnic group with dispersed settlements in an alien country, for the Hungarian nationalities a specific sense of neighborliess and home--linked with the land, people and state of Hungary--is more marked and prominent than the sense of belonging to another nation, which in the sense of the Germans is not even a neighboring nation.

On the other side, the Hungarians in neighboring countries think and feel, without reservation or constraint, as belonging to a large Hungarian nation which at least until 1918 had a political and national historic identity. Since then, the lines of development have come apart, with the consequence, no longer to be ignored, that the historic and national consciousness of the Hungarians in neighboring countries differs also from that of the Hungarian society in the motherland. For it has made considerable efforts in the last two decades to process, and thus to cope with, the more recent and even most recent past. That pertains particularly to the separation periods after 1918 which survive, at least in the historic consciousness of the ethnic groups, as still not processed and therefore doubly painful traumas of national catastrophes and reinforce, in particular, the traditional components of that nationalism challenged anyhow in the defensive struggle against the national peoples. Those are components which, if not yet surmounted, are no longer simply accepted without question and are often analyzed critically in the motherland. This cultural lag in historic and national consciousness as between the Hungarian society in the motherland and the Hungarian ethnic groups in the neighboring countries is further reinforced by the cultural policy in the neighboring states themselves which bears accents different from those in Hungary and permits much less elbow room. The Hungarian ethnic group in Yugoslavia has been spared such a development, to be sure, as it was least interfered with in participating in modern cultural life and relevant discussions in Hungary.

If we now weigh the pervasive structural differences between the Hungarian nationalities on the one side and the Hungarian ethnic groups, on the other, and confront them with the question raised, the question about the reciprocity of the Hungarian nationality policy and its chances and limits, we shall have to arrive at the following conclusion: The intended reciprocal application of the Hungarian nationality policy to the Hungarian ethnic groups beyond the national frontiers appears downright unrealistic and illusory, not last also because of the very different magnitude of the nationality problems on one side and the other.

## Origin of the Political Leitmotifs

Equally problematic is the bridgehead function by the nationalities on both sides Budapest has propagated. One question virtually imposes itself at this point: that of the origin and genesis of these two substantive leitmotifs or guidelines in Budapest's nationality policy.

If we first compare the development and caesuras of Hungarian nationality policy with the changes in the situation of the two largest Hungarian ethnic groups, in Romania and Slovakia, we find striking connections at once that may be expressed by the formula of "actio-ractio." "Actio," that is in the nationality policy of these neighboring states, then "reactio" in Budapest, after the pattern that a deterioration of the situation of the Hungarian ethnic groups is answered by improvements for the circumstances of the nationalities in one's own country. This at once reveals, as it were, the instrumental character of the Hungarian nationality policy, as a means of steering against relevant tendencies in the neighboring states.

Let us first examine the facts around the first caesura in the policy, around 1958. This caesura must be understood as one of the consequences of the 1956 events, by no means only of the events domestically but also beyond the national frontiers.

The wave of national excitement and revolutionary uproar had broken with so much thrust from the motherland across the frontiers in the Magyar settlement areas of Slovakia and Romania that the regimes concerned there found themselves compelled to repair their order, placed in doubt, by a number of instant measures such as troop parades, information shutdown, and blocking the regions and borders concerned. Prague as well as Bucharest in their first official announcements sought to justify to the Romanian and Czech population the intervention by the Soviet Army and the removal of the Imre Nagy regime by arguing it had been a matter of preventing the restoration of Hungarian fascism à la Horthy and the Hungarian irredentist movement. Thereby both governments indirectly admitted how much danger they found invoked by the massive unrest within the Hungarian groups in their population, nothing less than the danger of a revision of the Versailles border settlement. Both governments in subsequent years reacted to this writing on the wall by greatly switching their nationality policy around, which to the Hungarian ethnic groups affected meant a drastic deterioration of their situation and their rights.

Budapest's reaction was twosided and had no other purpose than to counter such a development. On 27 January 1958, Janos Kadar proclaimed before the Hungarian parliament in all formality the final and complete renunciation by the Hungarian People's Republic of any claims to territorial revisions vis-a-vis all neighboring states. In the fall that year, the Hungarian Politburo placed its nationality policy on a new and much more liberal basis than before.

Now let us look at the facts around the next caesura, around 1968: In that year they suddenly started to discuss in the Hungarian media, and that meant in public, a subject that had been taboo for two decades: the situation and fate of the Hungarian ethnic groups beyond the national frontiers.

This discussion had been induced from the outside. So it amounts to nothing but a reaction to the public debate on the living conditions and rights of the Hungarian ethnic group in Slovakia, conducted with full passion, frankness and intensity and one which the so-called Prague Spring had made possible there. The way in which the substantive accents were set, the hope seemed for the first time fairly reasonable--half a century after Versailles--that in the course of it an acceptable solution through a contractually arranged form for living together could be found both for the Slovak national people and the Hungarian minority.

The Hungarian Politburo resolutions passed in the fall of the same year, which brought a still valid and fairly generous settlement of all Hungarian nationality policy issues still unresolved up to then, evidently also had the function to bring a positive influence to bear on the discussion continuing in the neighboring country. That may also have something to do with the surprising fact that the Budapest party and state leadership took over some basic ideas of that discussion in the neighbors' country, appropriating them as leitmotifs for its policy, which it also has been trying since then to make prevail, with some persistence, in dealing with Romania. These leitmotifs are the idea or place of the bridgehead the nationalities are assuming here and yonder for improving bilateral relations and that of the reciprocity of any nationality policy altogether, expressed simply by the motto: you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours (your ethnic group, that is).

#### Summarization

Let us summarize the observations made and inferences drawn here under four theses:

1. Not until 1968 can one speak of a Hungarian nationality policy in today's tangible form of rationalization.
2. Its substantive structure, topical ideological justification and the analysis of the factors triggering it make apparent that all of Budapest's nationality policy efforts have a direct connection with the situation of the Hungarian ethnic groups in neighboring countries and their nationality policy.
3. This connection can be defined as the interdependence of Budapest's nationality policy on the developmental level of the Hungarian ethnic groups as nationalities and objects of the neighbor states' policy in that direction. Within the scope of this interdependence, Hungarian nationality policy gains an instrumental character as a means for countering deteriorations in the situation of the Hungarian ethnic groups, on the one side, and as means to influence the leading political and social forces in the neighbors' countries, on the other, in that one means to present to those forces a positive model for nationality policy in a socialist society.

As to the here more closely examined structural differences between Hungarian nationalities and Hungarian ethnic groups, the idea of the reciprocity of nationality policy can only be interpreted here as intentional, i.e., in the sense that this idea relates less to concrete measures taken by Budapest than to motives behind them, rather, which again have a reactive connection with a given situation of Hungarian ethnic groups.



4. Furthermore, the function of Budapest's nationality policy, looked at from the point of view of preserving and shoring up the system, is twofold: for one thing, properly to integrate its own country's population segments, heterogeneous in terms of their mother tongues, under the seal of an alliance policy, and then also, to facilitate for Hungarian society, the national people, the consensus with the system in a manner that keeps account of the undiminished national sense of this society. That then also ties into internal Hungarian policy one essential element of the national sense, the concern for the fate of the Hungarian ethnic groups beyond the frontier.

Another function of the Hungarian nationality policy in this context is to compensate for the definite departure from all revision aspirations by having party and state leadership assume a national leadership role, quite convincingly personified by Janos Kadar as the "nation's broker," who includes in his political endeavors the Hungarian ethnic groups beyond the national frontiers, even if in a most cautious manner that cannot always be clearly explained to Hungarian society for foreign policy reasons and system constraints.

In the field of tension between pragmatism and ideology, on the one side, and in the concrete effects the political posture has on nationalities in Hungary or Budapest's apparent political reservation has to nationality affairs in neighboring countries, on the other, a Hungarian foreign policy objective that is as complex as long-range becomes evident: The gradual cancellation of the boundaries still separating the Hungarian ethnic groups from their motherland, yet by no means through any territorial revision but through more intensive cooperation with the neighboring countries in question, in the scope of which the nationalities on either side of today's borders are to exercise the similarly long-range function of bridge-building catalysts for such a development.

A spiritual basis for such a development is formed also in Budapest by the revived and greatly favored regional consciousness under the concept of "East Central Europe," that seeks to move to the foreground of the political debate the idea, not binding in form as yet but decisive in substance, of the Danube region's countries and peoples belonging together and their vast identity of interests.

#### A. Population of Nationalities in Hungary

##### I. Census results 1960, 1970, 1980\*

<u>Ethnic Groups</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1980</u>
Germans	50,765	45,594	73,800
Slovaks	30,690	21,176	37,000
Southern Slavs	37,597	34,049	33,600
Romanians	15,787	12,624	11,600
Total	134,839	103,443	156,000
Compared with previous census	+41,639 (1949)	-31,396	+52,557

\*K8vago, Laszlo, "Nationalities in Today's Hungary" (in Hungarian), Budapest, 1981, p 20; and Stefka, Istvan, "Where Is Our Home?" (in Hungarian), Budapest, 1982, p 70.

II. According to Estimates by Local Authorities 1980 and by Nationality Associations 1983.\*

	<u>1980</u>	<u>1983</u>
Germans	123,400	230,000
Slovaks	68,000	100,000
Southern Slavs	39,700	95,000
Romanians	12,100	25,000
Totals	243,200	450,000

III. Number of pupils in schools instructing in the mother tongue.\*\* In parenthesis: number of pupils in schools instructing in the national tongue

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1982***</u>
Germans	11,075 (142)	9,460 (24)	19,497 (148)	24,250
Slovaks	10,760 (740)	4,649 (706)	7,177 (474)	12,000
Southern Slavs	4,233 (549)	3,934 (459)	3,894 (499)	-
Romanians	427 (1,087)	241 (802)	337 (637)	-
Totals	26,540 (2,517)	18,284 (1,991)	30,905 (2,058)	-

B. Statistical Data on Hungarian Ethnic Groups in Romania, Slovakia, Yugoslavia, Soviet Union

L. According to official census data 1930-1980\*\*\*\* (data in thousands)

<u>Country</u>	<u>1930</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>last</u>
Romania	1,353	1,559	1,597	1,670 (1977)
Slovakia	708	518	554	630 (1980)
Yugoslavia	400	459	439	420 (1981)
Soviet Union	-	146	152	171 (1979)
(Transcarpathian Ukraine) [115 (CSSR)]				
Totals	2,461	2,682	2,742	2,891
Hungary by comparison				
(Magyars only)	8,001	9,786	10,166	10,553 (1981)

\*1980 gave figures on the population approachable for and interested in fostering nationality cultures. The figures were taken from the book by Stefka, op. cit., p 70. Figures on 1983 according to BUDA PRESS, 10 January 1983.

\*\*Kovago, op. cit., pp 182 f.

\*\*\*According to BUDA PRESS, 10 January 1983.

\*\*\*\*Zoltan David, "Past and Present of the Hungarian Nationality Statistics" (in Hungarian), VALOSAG, Vol 23 (1980), No 8, p 97.

II. According to estimates by Zoltan David\* (Director of the Archives of the Central Statistical Office, Budapest)

	<u>1970</u>	<u>1980</u>
Romania	1,800	2,000
Slovakia	700	655
Yugoslavia	500	450
Soviet Union	200	200
Totals	3,200	3,305

III. The Ethnic Population Structure of the Autonomous Province of Voivodina\*\* (according to Yugoslav census 1971-1981)

	<u>1971</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>Difference</u>
Serbs	1,089,132 - 55.7%	1,106,240 - 54.5%	-1.2%
Magyars	423,866 - 21.7%	383,820 - 18.9%	-2.8%
Croatians	138,561 - 7.1%	108,630 - 5.3%	-1.8%
Slovaks	92,904 - 4.7%	88,968 - 4.3%	-0.4%
Romanians	52,987 - 2.7%	47,239 - 2.3%	-0.4%
"Yugoslavs"	46,928 - 2.4%	164,830 - 8.1%	+5.7%
Others	108,155 - 5.7%	128,562 - 5.6%	-0.1%
Total Population	1,952,533 -100.0%	2,028,289 -100.0%	+3.8%

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CSO: 3620/183

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### DISSIDENTS ON RESISTANCE TO NEW MISSILES

Amsterdam DE TIJD in Dutch 27 Jan 84 pp 18-19

[Report on interview with Czechoslovak dissidents Anna Sabattova and Vaclav Maly by Aart Zeeman: "Nuclear Arms in Czechoslovakia; Whoever Resists Is Punished"]

[Text] The peace movement is active not only in East Germany (DE TIJD 16 Dec); there are also protests in Czechoslovakia. The placing of Soviet missiles on Czech territory has unleashed a storm of protest in a country where it is still a luxury to campaign and demonstrate. Only the church keeps silent.

There are two names on the door: Anna Sabattova and Petr Uhl. The harsh sound of the bell resounds through the bare stairway landings. Anna opens the door. Her husband, Czechoslovak dissident Petr Uhl, has been in the infamous Mirova prison for almost 5 years already. Five years for activities in favor of human rights and against the regime. For the first time in all those years Anna was allowed to hand Petr a simple Christmas packet last December. In spite of her husband's tough prison sentence, Anna does not shrink from being extremely active herself in the dissident movement Charter '77.

It is a curious way of communicating. "Speak freely, but don't mention any names. Our rooms are filled with sensitive bugs. After we had moved into this building, one day a small army of plumbers arrived to inspect the heating system. They replaced heating pipes even in the ceiling and in the floor. Since that time the 'plumbing firm' has really been spoiling us. While other people in Prague have to wait for years to have their requests complied with, the quality of the pipes here is regularly inspected without being requested."

She really does not consider herself the appropriate person to be speaking about the protests against the placing of SS-21 and SS-22 missiles on Czechoslovak territory. "The unique aspect of this protest campaign is that this time it is not a Charter initiative. After the government had announced that it would place new missiles, a tremendous counter-offensive was unleashed. Meetings, festivals, concerts, petitions, etc., all under the motto: New Missiles for Peace. Prominent Charter members had been warned that in case of public resistance they had to count on a prison sentence of at least 15 years. Thus the necessary caution could be expected from that side. Everything appeared to be under control-- appeared to be, for the authorities had not taken the possibility into account that something like a spontaneous reaction might take place. A small group of workers and students drew up a petition in which the government was asked to

'resist the senseless increase of the number of nuclear arms. If we are truly discussing peace, we must not remain indifferent to the placing of nuclear arms in both the west and the east. Therefore we protest nuclear arms in the entire world, and thus also their being placed in Czechoslovakia.'"

### Scapegoat

On the face of it, that statement can hardly be called sensational with respect to its content. The STB, the Czechoslovak secret service, took steps as if it were a direct declaration of war--steps which would not be out of place in a scenario for a new James Bond movie, with Petr Pospichal, a 23-year old student from Brno, in the role of scapegoat. Unfortunately it was not a movie but the sad reality.

Anna Sabattova: "In the early morning of 9 December last year Petr Pospichal came to Prague by train from Brno with the intention to stay with a friend for a few weeks. At about 7:00 p.m. he stopped by our place, just for a little social visit. Less than an hour after his arrival two uniformed men of the security service stood at our door. It seemed that a notorious criminal had escaped from the Mirova prison, thus the same prison where my husband is imprisoned. The police had a strong suspicion that that "tough guy" had sought shelter in our apartment. The excuse could hardly be more transparent. An escaped prisoner who looks for shelter in the best guarded home in Prague? The intention was clear; one had to find some kind of excuse to arrest Petr.

"That is what happened. In searching the house they found--how surprising!--Petr. He had to go along to the police station Vinarice, was detained for 4 days and subsequently was sent back to Brno. Just before Brno, three armed men took Petr off the train and put him in a car. What happened afterward can barely be imagined by a normal person.

"After having been harassed with the most terrible threats for many hours, Petr was forced to drive in the direction of Breclav, the former Breslau, near the border of Austria. The gentlemen of the STB pointedly uncocked the safety lock of their weapons. "If you are so much in love with the West, just go ahead and cross over." It was as transparent as the devil's game. The party paper RUDE PRAVO then was to report a few days later: 'During an attempt to escape to Austria, 23-year old Petr Pospichal was shot down.' However, things did not go that far, thank god. Petr was no longer able to withstand the inhuman tension. In a state of shock, he was taken to the doctor in a nearby village."

Those who do not conform are brainwashed in this cruel manner. If Petr should become active again in the opposition movement, it is quite possible that he would disappear for an extended period, or worse: that he would be liquidated. He would not be the first.

### Two Thousand Signatures

In spite of the stubborn obstruction of the STB, the protest campaign very rapidly spread over various cities. Meanwhile 2,000 signatures have been collected on the petition, an unprecedented high number. Putting down one's signature is not merely a formality; it could have drastic consequences for one's daily life. One's education, job and future are at stake.



The protest did not remain limited to signatures. At the machine plant CKD, the largest and oldest factory in Prague, workers adopted a statement in which they speak out against the placing of new missiles in the East and West. At the big mining company Geofisika, employees unconditionally spoke out against the arrival of new Soviet missiles.

[Question] It all looks very promising: a successful petition campaign, protests in a number of factories; yet, the missiles are naturally placed. Surely there is no sense whatsoever in protesting in Czechoslovakia?

Anna, friendly but determined: "If it were not such a serious subject, I would find your question witty. Namely, I could ask you the very same question. I saw them on TV here--hundreds of thousands of Netherlanders who, together with their queen, demonstrated against nuclear armament.(Oh, so it was a sister of your queen?) Or, to put it more correctly: demonstrated against the American missiles. For of course we did not get to see slogans against the Soviet missiles here, but let's leave that aside. Many millions of Netherlanders are concerned about nuclear armament; many hundreds of thousands take to the streets. And the result? Those missiles were indeed placed in your country."

[Question] They're not there yet.

[Sabattova] "Not yet. In the other NATO countries they have already been placed, so they'll certainly come to your country too. However that may be, it is not a matter of us East Europeans protesting American missiles, just as it isn't a matter of your resisting exclusively Soviet missiles. What is important is that we, as Europeans with one tradition and one culture, must not sacrifice our territory as a battlefield for the superpowers."

### Chameleons

A sullen rain shower completes the mood. Prague, once the center of European culture, now a cheerless city. The inhabitants have adapted to their sad surroundings like chameleons. Somber suits and dresses from the sixties are worn. My dark blue coat and inconspicuous corduroy pants provide insufficient protection against persistent moneychangers. "Do you want to exchange, change money?" [in German] you hear constantly.

Vaclav Maly's words almost sound reprimanding. "If you really wanted to disguise yourself as an East European, you should never have worn those leather shoes. Everyone wears plastic footwear here."

Just like Petr Uhl, Vaclav Maly had also been imprisoned due to his activities in the defense of human rights. Before Maly became a Charter 77 spokesman, he worked as a chaplain in Vlasim and Pilsen. His involvement with Charter cost him his permit to work as a clergyman in a community. Now he works as a fireman in a third-class hotel in Prague.

[Question] In East Germany the Evangelical Church plays an important role in the peace movement. In Czechoslovakia the church is almost never mentioned when it is a matter of peace problems. Why not?

Vaclav Maly: "The big difference between East Germany and Czechoslovakia is the fact that the Roman Catholic Church is the largest church here. To the regime, that church is enemy of the state number one. The rulers are extremely fearful of a church whose power center is outside of Czechoslovakia, namely in the Vatican in Rome. That is a continual threat to the authorities, certainly with the 'ghost of Poland' still fresh in mind.

"A last but not unimportant reason for the hostilities toward the Roman Catholic Church is the coming into being of a church operating underground. Youths are searching for alternative ways to establish contacts with each other. Everywhere in the country 'grass roots communities' are arising where older people are being trained spiritually and young people receive catechism classes. Those activities are making the secret service extremely nervous. They are in danger of losing sight of what is going on within the churches."

#### Political Propaganda

[Question] But surely, given that, there must be the possibility for the church to bring up the concern about the increasing nuclear armament?

[Vaclav Maly] "Demonstrating and campaigning is a luxury. You have that possibility; we simply cannot afford it. Here the existential question comes first of whether it will even be possible to still bring the gospel to future generations in our country. The peace problem is not all-important in the thinking of our religious people. For that matter, that is not only because of the fact that we necessarily have to concentrate on that basic question. When the word peace is used officially here, it is always related, in one way or another, to political propaganda, propaganda which speaks unilaterally about the situation in the world and about peace. Therefore religious people say: we don't want anything to do with politics. We will spread quiet and peace around us through our good deeds. Naturally the increasing nuclear armament also causes us, the church, deep concern. But the question of survival, of 'to be or not to be,' is first and foremost to us."

8700

CSO: 3614/40



GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

FRG COMMENT ON REVIVED ECUMENISM, PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 28 Jan 84 p 10

[Article by Peter Jochen Winters, head of Berlin editorial staff: "Christians Move Closer Together"]

[Text] An ecumenical service on the occasion of the 1984 Week of Prayer for Christian Unity. Saint Hedwig's Cathedral in East Berlin is jam-packed as the bishop of Berlin, Cardinal Meisner, and the bishop of the Berlin-Brandenburg Protestant Church, Forck, enter the church together. Protestant and Catholic Christians are jammed together in the rows of seats or crowding along the walls. It is the first time that Bishop Forck and Cardinal Meisner are conducting a joint service. One has to go a long way back for an event of this kind. The last joint service conducted by by the Protestant and Catholic bishops in East Berlin took place 9 years ago, on 18 January 1975. At that time the predecessors of Meisner and Forck, Cardinal Bengsch and Bishop Schoenherr, stood together before the altar of Saint Hedwig's. The accommodation the Protestant Church reached with the state on 6 March 1978, the fact that the Protestant Church in the GDR described itself as a "church in socialism," caused Cardinal Bengsch to become aloof. Seeking to guard the Catholic Church in the GDR against any kind of political stand and possible accommodation at the hands of the Marxist-Leninist state, Cardinal Bengsch was afraid that in the case of closer cooperation with the Protestant Church the Catholic Church, through the ecumenical backdoor as it were, might be involved in so-called peace activity and other more political activities which could only prove injurious.

Cardinal Bengsch died in 1979, and Bishop Schoenherr retired in 1981. Those who succeeded them in their posts are trying to approach each other without bias and to intensify relations between the Protestant Church and the Catholic Diocese. Any cooperation has to be limited, however. The realities of ecclesiastical politics have not changed since the time of Bengsch and Schoenherr. The Protestant Church is adhering to to its 1978 accommodation with the state, and the Catholic Church--not least because it is a church of diaspora in the GDR--is persisting in its abstinence from politics. This, however, does not prevent the bishops from speaking up whenever state or social demands and constraints infringe on the freedom of religion and conscience of Catholics in the GDR. Whenever the Catholic Church has something to say in these matters, it does so on its own account as it were.

To this day it is impossible to imagine a joint document by the Protestant and Catholic churches in the GDR on, say, nuclear armament and disarmament or on the ecological problems which are becoming ever more pressing. True, a couple of years ago the Consistory of the Protestant Church and the Office of the Catholic Diocese formed a liaison group in East Berlin in which questions of common interest are discussed and consultations on specific issues are conducted. But, if nothing else, the different constitutions of the two churches make it difficult to reach agreements between them. Thus the Catholic Church, an organization with a strict hierarchy where only the word of the pope and the bishops counts, point out that in view of the synodal structure of the Protestant Church any decision in the final analysis has to be made by a synod and that synods are highly unpredictable decisionmaking bodies. And finally, it is pointed out, the Conference of Protestant Church Directorates in the GDR is not the same as the Catholic Berlin Bishops Conference.

Such "church political" considerations, however, are alien to Catholic and Protestant Christians in the parishes. Wherever Protestant and Catholic Christians live together in the GDR, ecumenism is practiced to a far greater degree than one would imagine. In the parishes, "locally," the Christian striving for unity is vigorous if only because both Protestant Christians and Catholics are up against the same thing in their socialist environment when they profess to be Christians in school, while learning a trade or while exercising a profession or if for religious reason they refuse to do armed military service or engage in firearm training.

In Saint Hedwig's Cathedral also a group of construction soldiers wearing the GDR National People's Army uniform--in other words, young men who have refused to do armed military service--listens to the sermons of Bishops Forck and Meisner pointing to Christ as the crucified, whom to follow God has made the task of Christians of both denominations. "Let us pray...that we may perceive the split of the church as something objectionable and not get accustomed to it, that we do not hold our church customs which we have come to cherish any dearer than the command of the Lord, that we may turn around and jointly fulfill our mission as Christians." So profess on this January evening in Saint Hedwig's Cathedral in Bebel-Platz in East Berlin both bishop and cardinal, priest and pastor, Catholic and Protestant. Once dismissed into the cold outside and real socialism, quite a number of them may keep thinking of Bishop Forck's remarks that God is already the Lord and that Christians already may profess him or may be repeating the cardinal's statement that the last reason for godlessness is fear of God's justice.

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MILITARY APPLICATIONS OF MICROELECTRONICS DETAILED

East Berlin MILITAERTECHNIK in German No 5, 1983 (signed to press 12 Jul 83)  
pp 258-262

[ Principles, Functions, Trends feature by Lt Col Dr W. Roscher: "Micro electronics and Their Use in Military Technology"]

[Text] To an increasing extent, scientific-technical progress in military matters is characterized by the use of microelectronics and especially of highly integrated circuits - the LSI and VLSI technologies. At the beginning of the 70's, it became possible for the first time to produce economically favorable complex circuits with  $10^3$  or  $10^4$  transistors on a  $12 \text{ mm}^2$  chip.

The objective of the present article is to offer some considerations concerning the technology, properties, applications, and developmental trends of integrated circuitry, and to indicate selected examples of the use of microelectronics in military engineering, whose principles are presently characteristic for the technology of most modern armies.

1. Microelectronics - Production, Applications, and Developmental Trends

In all areas of our life, microelectronics is now having an impact. Program-controlled washing machines, radio and television units, tv attachments, calculators, digital watches, cardiac pacemakers, and, in the not too distant future, control elements for motor vehicles will be essentially determined in their functional capability by the products of microelectronics.

Microelectronics has developed from the point transistor that was created in 1948 and from the planar and epitaxial technology that has been known since 1960.

The basic idea of microelectronics is to create a complete circuit, the integrated circuit, within a uniform technological process, from a single semiconductor crystal. It thus initiates a new generation in electronics.

Four technologies can be distinguished in the production of integrated circuits:

Layer technology, in which the individual components are applied to a glass or ceramic substrate in the form of thin layers (thin layer technology, layer thickness less than  $1 \mu\text{m}$ ) or in the form of thicker layers (thick layer technology, layer thickness greater than  $1 \mu\text{m}$ ),

Semiconductor block technology, in which individual components are introduced into a single-crystal semiconductor by means of selective doping,

Semiconductor film technology, in which a single-crystal silicon film (layer thickness less than  $1\text{ }\mu\text{m}$ ) is applied to a single-crystal insulator (sapphire), where the film contains the individual components,

Hybrid technology, which represents a combination of discrete components and film circuits or of film circuits and semiconductor block circuits.

In semiconductor block technology, one distinguishes according to the number of individual components that are housed in a common solid - the chip. There are different degrees of integration:

- small scale integration (SSI): 10 to 100 components per chip
- medium scale integration (MSI): 100 to  $10^3$  components per chip
- large scale integration (LSI):  $10^3$  to  $10^4$  components per chip
- very large scale integration (VLSI):  $>10^4$  components per chip

Typical switching circuits of the individual integration stages are given in Table 1. This presentation shows that, among the integrated circuits, especially the digital circuit occupy a high place. To a certain extent, they embody the revolutionary elements.

The significance of microelectronics can be elucidated particularly impressively by way of digital circuits. Precisely in data processing and transmission technology, in computer technology, and in automation technology, they occupy a key position.

The amount of information that must be processed and stored is constantly increasing. This demands a circuit technology which leads to smaller and smaller dimensions and which reduces the loss power of an electronic circuit. It demands a circuit technology which makes possible higher and higher limit frequencies and thus shorter gate delay times. As the lot size increases, manufacturing costs must decrease. Finally, this circuit technology should drastically reduce the failure rate or increase reliability. Integrated circuit technology makes it possible to fulfill the above requirements.

High reliability can be illustrated especially clearly by the magnitude of the failure rate  $\lambda$ . For a discrete component, the transistor, the failure rate is around  $\lambda = (0.01 \text{ to } 0.05) \times 10^{-6}/\text{h}$ . For an integrated circuit, consisting of thousands of transistors, it is about  $\lambda = (1 \text{ to } 0.0001) \times 10^{-6}/\text{h}$ . Figure 1 shows a loss-power/delay-time diagram for various digital circuit techniques. The chip surface  $A_{\text{ch}}$  is constantly increasing; also the surface  $A_{\text{E}}$  which is required to create a transistor is constantly reducing with increasing integration level. These factors favor miniaturization of the dimensions of integrated circuits. Figure 2 shows the development of the chip surface  $A_{\text{ch}}$  and of the surface  $A_{\text{E}}$ , required for a transistor as a function of the calendar year.

The following trends can now be delineated for the further development of microelectronics:

Tabelle 1 Typische Schaltkreise der Integrationsstufen			
1	analoge Schaltungen	digitale Schaltungen	2
SSI	3 NF-Verstärker	UND-/ODER-Gatter	4
	5 Operations- verstärker	Flip-Flop	6
	7 Spannungs- stabilisator		
MSI	8 AM-ZF-Ver- stärker mit Demodulator	Volladder	9
	11 SECAM- Decoder	Register	10
LSI		8-bit-Mikro- prozessor	12
		4-kbit-Halbleiter- speicher	13
		16-kbit-Halbleiter- speicher	14
VLSI		16-bit-Mikro- prozessor	15
		32-bit-Mikro- prozessor	16
		64-kbit-Halbleiter- speicher	17
		Ein-Chip-Mikro- rechner	18

Table 1. Typical switching circuits of integration stages

- 1 analog circuits
- 2 digital circuits
- 3 LF amplifiers
- 4 AND/OR gates
- 5 operational amplifiers
- 6 flip/flop
- 7 voltage stabilizer
- 8 AM-IF amplifier with demodulator
- 9 full adder
- 10 register
- 11 SECAM decoder
- 12 8-bit microprocessor
- 13 4 Kbit semiconductor memory
- 14 16 kbit semiconductor memory
- 15 16 bit microprocessor
- 16 32 bit microprocessor
- 17 64 kbit semiconductor memory
- 18 single chip microcomputer




Figure 1. Loss-power/delay-time diagram [1].  $t_d$  delay time  $P_v$  loss power  
For microelectronic terms, see collection of terms "militärtechnik"  
(Military Engineering) Issue 3/1983 ff (cardboard supplement).

- 1 technical progress
- 2 MIS short channel

Increasing  $A_{ch}$  to about  $100 \text{ mm}^2$  and a further reduction of  $A_E$ . This means that the base width of the bipolar transistor and the channel length of the MIS transistor will shrink from  $1 \text{ } \mu\text{m}$  to  $0.1 \text{ } \mu\text{m}$ . The transition to so-called submicrometer technology is thus created.

Replacement of the silicon substrate as the support of integrated circuits by sapphire. Here one speaks of SOS technology, where a silicon epitaxial layer is applied to a sapphire substrate (Figure 3). In this way, one achieves higher reliability, lower loss power, a high degree of independence from temperature, higher switching rates, and higher resistance to radiation [2].

Production of monolithic microwave switching circuits by using the SCHOTTKY-barrier gate field transistors based on gallium arsenide with gate running times of 25 ps.






Figure 2. Chip size and surface of the function element [1]

$A_{ch}$  chip surface  $A_E$  function element surface (surface needed for one transistor)

Key:

- 1 technical
- 2 sub-micrometer technology
- 3 physical-technical limit
- 4 theoretical limit region




Figure 3. Comparison of the cross-section of bipolar and SOS transistors [1]

- 1 p-substrate
- 2 bipolar npn transistor
- 3 Si layer
- 4 sapphire substrate
- 5 SOS transistor




Figure 4. ICL gate [3]

$I_{st}$  control current  $I_g$  gate current  $J_1, J_2$  SQUIDS (highly sensitive magnetic field measuring units based on superconduction)




Figure 5. Basic transistor structure of a surface-wave piezofilter [4]

- 1 input
- 2 substrate
- 3 output

Through the microwave technique, high-speed systems are to be developed on one chip as the new revolutionary element of microelectronics [2].

Transition to operating temperatures of less than 10 K by using the JOSEPHSON effect (Figure 4). The advantages here are extremely short switching times of the order of 1 ps, minimal loss powers ( $< 1 \mu\text{W}$ ), and extremely large bandwidths of  $f = 0$  to  $10^{12}$  Hz. Production technologies of semiconductor techniques can also be used here [3].

Linking the acoustic and semiconductor microelectronics to create sensitive elements in the form of piezoelectric filters for integrated circuits, on the basis of  $\text{LiNbO}_3$  as substrate material (Figure 5). Such transducers are used in radar technology.

## 2. Examples of Using Microelectronics in Military Engineering

Microelectronics is increasingly being used in the weapon systems of the 80's and 90's. This involves a new quality of scientific-technical development of the weapon systems. This impressive further development can be recognized in the following areas, according to an analysis of the literature.

Firing-guidance systems in a combination of reconnaissance and range-measuring systems, as well as weapon-stabilizing systems in combination with programmable computers, where one can input the tactical-technical, topographical, meteorological and ballistic initial conditions,

Target acquisition systems with all-weather sensors, which are highly sensitive by day and by night, based on residual light amplification, heat picture technology, battlefield radar units, and laser technology,

Automatic self-testing systems for automatic function tests and direct switch-off of a defective part of the system within a weapon system,

Communication systems for data processing on board a weapon system and for remote data transmission by means of light conductor technology, pulse code modulation, frequency multiplex methods, and data bus systems.

### 2.1 Automatic Weapon Systems

The developmental trend of SSL weapon systems (weapon systems on self-propelled mounts) is oriented towards automating the handling processes, beginning from target location, through aiming, up to destruction of the target (Figure 6). For aiming, the use of various methods is typical. Thus, the following are used for finding the target:

- residual light amplifiers, which use the residual light available by night,
- heat picture units for acquiring targets whose heat radiation ( $\lambda = 8$  to  $13 \mu\text{m}$ ) differs clearly from that of the environment
- optical units for target acquisition by daylight and at dusk and
- battle-field radar units for ranges up to 20 km.

The stereoscopic rangefinder, the laser rangefinder, based on pulse-running time measurements, or the phase comparison measurement and the battle-field radar unit with target marks are primarily used to survey the target.

The laser rangefinder and the battle-field radar unit are coupled to an analog/digital converter, so that the necessary signals are present in BDC code for further processing by means of a microprocessor.

The weapon is stabilized by means of a gyroscope (inertial principle) or by means of a laser gyroscope, currently under development, and a voltage signal output. A subsequent analog-digital converter provides digital signals for the microprocessor.

The input multiplexer is used for optionally switching individual measurement points on the microprocessor data bus. The microprocessor is controlled through a control logic circuit and embodies the central processing unit. It consists of LSI switching circuits and implements the logical and arithmetic functions. As an autonomous, program-controlled functional unit, it has available a data address register, an arithmetic-logic unit (ALU), a control unit, a buffer, and an internal bus.

The ROM memory, as a fixed-value memory, serves the microprocessor as a program memory and as a memory for the specific tactical-technical data of the weapon system, as well as for constant correction variables concerning the effect of temperature and air pressure.

The RAM memory, as a write-read memory, is used to store changeable information, like the data concerning target ranges, or meteorological as well as ballistical initial conditions when firing.

The connection between the microprocessor, the memories, and the terminal units for the multiplexers are implemented through an external bus system, with a very small complement of long lines and switching points.

An output multiplexer is used to connect the position elements of the microprocessor (electromachine amplifier and gyro block), via digital-analog converters. The positioning elements align the weapon and stabilize its position.

## 2.2 Automatic Navigational System

The navigational system is used for orientation in unknown terrain and with limited view. It provides information concerning the coordinates and concerning the directional angle of the instantaneous position of the combat vehicle. It allows driving blind under poor viewing conditions (Figure 7).

An electronic pulse generator is used as a transducer for the distance traversed by the combat vehicle and gyro compass or magnetic field probe is used as course transducers.

The coding equipment and the analog-digital converters match the input signal, via the input multiplexer, to the microprocessor. The ROM memory contains the program for the microprocesosr as well as constants such as correction coefficients for the

marching route, for the effect of temperature and of air pressure.

The coordinates of the starting point  $(x_0, y_0)$ , the directional angle of the starting point  $(\alpha_{k0})$ , and the geographical latitude as well as data concerning the conditions of the marching route and conditions for the terrain are entered into the RAM memory.

The microprocessor converts the polar coordinates into cartesian coordinates. An output multiplexer, working through a digital-analog converter, matches analog positioning motors for the x- and y-coordinates to the central processing unit - the microprocessor.

Planchets with a topographical map for various map scales, or also projection equipment for colored map segments, are used to display the position.

### 2.3 Automatic Self-Testing System

As weapons engineering involves more electronic equipment, microelectronics is also used for computer-controlled testing. In this way, defects can be detected and localized, defective modules can be automatically switched off, and reserve modules can be automatically switched in.

To check the trouble-free operation of all modules, a systems test proceeds at fixed time intervals. If a defect exists, it is automatically circumscribed.

Figure 8 shows the basic structure of a self-testing system. Data characteristics for the functional sequence within a module are interrogated according to a pulse diagram and are stored in an intermediate memory. The design data of the interrogated parameters are stored in the read-write memory (RAM).

The microprocessor is controlled through the program memory ROM. Within the microprocessor a comparison is made between the actual value called from the intermediate memory and the design value called from the RAM. If a deviation beyond the allowable tolerance exists, the microprocessor initiates an error signal (light-horn) through the IEC bus, and causes replacement of the defective module [5].

### 2.4 Control of a Missile by means of a Microprocessor

In this case, a microprocessor is used to control all essential functional sequences of a weapon system centrally in accord with a pulse diagram. In this way, control devices that are expensive in terms of volume, weight, and price can be obviated.

Figure 9 shows a typical bus structure. The great advantage of the bus system compared to conventional cabling is that a large number of lines is saved. If, with conventional cabling of the control circuits of a missile, one needs 400 to 500 lines, only about 20 lines are needed with microprocessor control, lines which appear within the bus system.

If one considers that primarily digital signals occur within the microprocessor control, which can be effectively transmitted through light-conducting fibers, the advantages of light-conductor technology are combined with microelectronics.






Figure 6. Automatic weapon system

A-D-W analog digital converter D-A-W digital analog converter

ROM fixed value memory RAM read-write memory

Key:

- 1 output multiplexer
- 2 positioning element
- 3 sight
- 4 positioning element
- 5 power amplifier
- 6 gyro block
- 7 gun barrel
- 8 measuring element
- 9 aiming drive
- 10 microprocessor
- 11 pulse generator
- 12 input multiplexer
- 13 laser rangefinder
- 14 battle-field radar unit
- 15 stereoscopic rangefinder
- 16 data input





Figure 7. Automatic navigation system

Key:

- 1 pulse generator
- 2 data input
- 3 microprocessor
- 4 input multiplexer
- 5 path transducer
- 6 course transducer
- 7 output multiplexer
- 8 positioning motor
- 9 positioning motor
- 10 course table



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Figure 8. Automatic self-testing system [5]

Key:

- 1 module 1
- 2 module 2
- 3 module 3
- 4 module 4
- 5 module 5
- 6 module 6
- 7 intermediate storage 1
- 8 intermediate storage 2
- 9 intermediate storage 3
- 10 microprocessor
- 11 pulse generator
- 12 input and output
- 13 data bus
- 14 microcomputer bus
- 15 IEC bus
- 16 external data transmission




Figure 9. Functional units of the microcomputer connected through a bus system

Key:

- 1 address-, data-, and control-bus
- 2 interface control
- 3 user system




Figure 10. Control of a missile by means of a microprocessor

Key:

- 1 warhead
- 2 additional signals
- 3 process input and output unit
- 4 operating and display panel
- 5 microprocessor
- 6 onboard computer
- 7 gyro, horizontal
- 8 gyro, vertical
- 9 gyro, integrator
- 10 sensor for payload
- 11 propellant system
- 12 electrical supply unit with battery
- 13 control for the propulsion system
- 14 rudder with rudder machine

Light-conducting fibers are electrically non-conducting. It is thus possible to separate the data source and the data receiver electrically from one another. They cannot be influenced by electrical or magnetic fields. For this reason, expensive shielding cables are obviated. Finally, they have small dimension, small mass, and are relatively cheap.

Figure 10 shows a possible variant of missile control via microprocessor.

### 3. Final Remarks

The principle of equal military security requires of the Socialist countries that they also put into the service of national defense the recent productive forces which the scientific-technical revolution provides. One of the fundamental aspects of the scientific-technical revolution is microelectronics.

NATO is making great efforts to gain an advantage in weapons technology by means of microelectronics. Thus, in the Socialist combat forces, too, the processes of modern troop guidance, of reconnaissance, and of weaponry, must increasingly be influenced by the development of microelectronics. The members of the army must be prepared for the qualitatively increased requirements of the 80's and the 90's and this also implies making them familiar with modern knowledge in the field of microelectronics.

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## RF-78 PILE DRIVER DISCUSSED

East Berlin MILITAERTECHNIK in German No 3, 6 May 81 pp 131-133

[Article by J. Grund: "The RF-78 Pile Driver"]

[Text] The RF-78 is a special ferry for driving piles and pile bents up to six in number. Its basic construction is the same as the RF-68 and the RF 68M. It is used for building temporary bridges and in combined bridge construction in standing and flowing water of speeds up to 2 ms/sec, wave height up to 0.5 ms and wind speeds up to 10 ms/sec (about wind force 6).

### 1. Differences Between the RF-68 and the RF-78

The main difference between the two piledrivers is that the RF-78 has been equipped with more powerful diesel rams, new ram housings and an electrical system.

The new DM-150 A diesel rams have a 50-percent higher impact force than the NB-180 type rams on the RF-68. The maximum number of blows per minute is slightly less with the DM-150 A, but because of the greater impact force the piles can be driven faster than with the NB-180.

The total weight of a DM-150 A is 460 kg, fuel consumption is about 1.5 liters/hour and piles up to 220 mm in diameter can be driven without special preparation of the pile head. An additional advantage is that the pile does not have to be attached to the ram. There is a conical receptacle on the lower section of the ram, into which the pile is inserted. The driving part of the DM-150 A is not tripped independently, but by means of a tackle.

Each ram housing consists of two driver masts which can be rotated on their mounts in the base frame. When they are vertical, they are held by spreader support poles resembling a turnbuckle. The length of the spreader poles can be adjusted.

In turn, each driver mast consists of an upper and a lower section which are connected. To prepare them for transportation, the driver masts are swung down, the upper sections are detached from the center sections and the lower sections are folded up. The upper sections are stored between the center sections. Ready for transportation, the RF-78 is 200 mm lower than the RF-68.

On the RF-78, the distance between centers of the diesel rams in one section is 1,000 mm. Pile bent width can be reduced by increments of 250 mm between 6,000 mm and 3,500 mm.

The electrical system consists of two diesel-electric power plants, six electric hoists, two fans, a lighting system and the cables and plugs. Each 3-meter pontoon has an electric motor installed, with an output of 4 kVA, ventilated by an electric fan through the ventilator heads on the deck.

The electric motors supply the power to operate the six electric hoists and three lights. Each ram section has two hoists to lift the rams and/or the piles.

Distribution is by a 4-wire system, with a grounded center wire. The zero-voltage neutral wire, which is connected to the protective ground, acts as a safety measure.

Note:

A ground connection must be made between the two 6-meter pontoons and the 6-meter pontoons and the 3-meter pontoon to provide a protective ground.

The electric hoists can also be supplied with current from land, using a suitable outside source of energy.

## 2. Instructions for Using the RF-78

### 2.1 Starting Operations

The pontoons are prepared for launching at the assembly area. The mooring lines must be attached at the established points on the pontoons. This is particularly important when the vehicles are able to drive up side by side to drop the pontoons where the banks are suitable. It is also important to check for correct attachment of the brace wires. On transport unit II they must be attached with the short end on the right side of the pontoon, and on transport unit III with the short end on the left side. The following operations must also be carried out;

On the 3-meter pontoons the turnbuckles must be hooked up on the side opposite the pivot beam, the long ends of the brace wires must be slackened and coiled on the pontoons. After the tarpaulins have been removed from the ram sections, the driver masts must be assembled to form a transport triangle. During assembly, the upper sections must not be laid on the rams, because the actuating levers will be bent.

If three ram sections are to be used on the ferry, the tarpaulins and hoops are to be removed from the transport vehicle and the hangers laid on the section. The transport triangle is then assembled on the piledriver ferry.

When piles are being driven from the shore, the vehicles must be positioned as follows, from downstream to upstream:

Driving with two ram sections:

--right bank	vehicle I, III, II
--left bank	vehicle I, II, III

Driving with three ram sections:

--right bank	vehicle I, II, III
--left bank	vehicle I, III, II

Assembly of the RF-78 is carried out according to instructions and is basically the same as for the RF-68. Once this work is completed, the support shaft on the base frame are screwed upward and the ram sections are rotated 180 degrees (the electric hoists point at the anchor winches). Then the support shafts are screwed back again, and the cable connections are made between the pontoons. The electric power plants should be allowed to warm up during the assembly process.

Further assembly is carried out as follows: the transport triangle is undone, the upper sections are folded down and held with lockpins. Next, the winch cables must be arranged correctly (they must not be twisted and the hooks of the blocks must be hooked into the eyes of the lifting equipment), the ram sections must be swung into their working locations and pushed into the position corresponding with the width that has been set for the pile bent. Then the lower sections of the driver masts are folded down, locked and the rams are pushed up to the lower end of the mast. Care must be exercised that the masts do not tip over to the other side.

The support spreader poles must first be attached to the mast and then to the base frame. After that, the ram housings are put up.

The RF-78 has pile cables with loops. Each pile cable is laid around the pile as a noose about 500 mm from the face of the pile head and then drawn tight. The free loop is hung in one of the hooks on the pile receptacle. Now the ram and the pile can be raised until the tip of the pile no longer touches the river bottom.

## 2.2. Driving Supports

To make intermediate supports, the RF-78 is floated into position with a tug along the axis of the bridge. The piles are hanging on the raised rams. After it has been positioned, the ferry is tied up to the shore beam or the trestle and the rams are lowered. While this is being done, the piles must be pressed against the pile guides. Once the tips touch the river bottom, the pile head must be guided into the holder and the cable removed. The head of the pile must sit centrally on the impact pad. The procedure continues as follows: the connecting links on the striker must be released and the striker must be raised until the piston is free. Using the adjustment lever, the injection pump has to be primed until four atomized sprays of fuel issue from the injector nozzle. Following this, the striker is raised to its highest

position and tripped. This starts the ram. The drop height of the striker and the number of strokes is regulated with the actuating lever.

The normal depth to which piles are driven is 2.5 ms. Driving can be stopped before this if the outside values for the penetration depth of the piles are reached during driving in a series of 10 impacts or less.

After the driving, the pivot beam is detached from the crossbeam of the trestle or the shore beam and the ferry is moved on by the distance of one pile bent width. The ferry is attached to the driven piles with clamps which brace the pivot beam solidly to the two piles. The additional steps to complete the pile bent are the same as for the RF-68.

In a strong current, or in a high wind, a suitable anchor must be laid from the 6-meter pontoon to prevent the piledriver ferry from drifting out of the axis of the bridge.

### 2.3 Cessation of Operations

Disassembly of the RF-78 is carried out in the reverse sequence. To pull the pontoons up onto the transport vehicles, the ram sections must be pushed until the switch boxes of the electric hoists line up with the front wall of the pontoon.

#### Note:

Loading a 6-meter pontoon onto a transport vehicle I and loading the 3-meter pontoons onto the transport vehicles II and III is forbidden.

It is important to have a guide standing by the quick-release mechanism during the loading procedure. The vehicle driver must stop the loading process immediately upon his signal that the left front bollard is engaged. If this signal is ignored, the front and rear supports for the guide pulleys are put under excessive strain and can be damaged. After the pontoons have been secured, the winch cable should be released, the draw hook unhitched from the pontoon secured in the mount provided for it on the vehicle.

### 2.4 Preparing the Piles

Piles with a head diameter up to 220 mm should be prepared as follows: piles of approximately the same diameter should be cut to length and sharpened to a point (only if the subsoil is firm)<sup>2</sup>. The upper face must be cut at right angles to the axis of the pile. A maximum angle of 10 mm to the axis of the pile is permissible, referred to the pile diameter. If the subsoil is soft, the pile should not be sharpened to a point. If necessary, a board should be nailed to the bottom face in order to obtain the back pressure necessary to start the ram. With piles having a head diameter greater than 220 mm, the head should be reduced to 220 mm over a length of 300 mm.

### 3. Instructions for Service

The RF-78 should be inspected and serviced before, during and after use, following a precisely established system.

The types of service are:

--Inspection before use (KDvE); it is carried out before each operation if the last maintenance was carried out more than 5 hours previously.

--Inspection during operation (KDwE); it takes place during breaks in operation, at the latest after 1 to 2 hours of use (Nh).

--Daily technical maintenance (TTW); it is performed following each operation.

--Technical maintenance No 1 (TW 1); it is performed after 20 Nh.

--Technical maintenance No 2 (TW 2); it must be carried out after 40 Nh.

Transport vehicle service is performed according to the recommendations of the vehicle service schedule, those of the motor-driven chain saws in accordance with the applicable instructions. The appropriate military regulations as well as the applicable ASAO [acronym not identified] must be followed. The entire electrical system must be serviced with particular care. Accidents and breakdowns resulting from corrosion and dirty voltage-carrying parts should be repaired immediately. The pontoons should be properly ventilated to restrict as far as possible the formation of condensation.

### 4. Instructions for Repair

From the operational standpoint, it is mostly components that are classified as running repairs that are replaced. Wire cables are replaced if there are as many as 5 broken wires per lay in lang-lay cables and 24 broken wires per lay in ordinary-lay cables; also in the event of crushing, wear or corrosion of the outer wires up to 40 percent of the diameter of an individual wire and if there is any danger of an entire strand breaking.

When replacing damaged retaining bolts on the winch frame, the cable fasteners and the housings for the electric power plants, only bolts of the same quality should be used.

Welding work on load-bearing steel components may only be carried out by welders with the proper authorization. The welding of leaks on the pontoons is performed using hand-held electric welding equipment with T1 VII m electrodes 2.5 mm in diameter; carbon arc welding with 10 MnSi 6 welding wire 0.8 mm in diameter or by gas welding with MbK 10 welding wire. Before welding, paint on the inside and outside and the antislip coating at the welding location must be completely removed.



## 5. Safety Regulations

The following are the most important safety regulations which must be observed during operation of the RF-78.

--Transport vehicles I, II and III are not to be used for any other than their intended purpose.

--Loading equipment is only to be used for transferring the third ram section(maximum capacity 1.5 tons).

--Electric hoists are not to be used for pulling driven piles.

--Electric power plants are only to be operated by qualified persons with proper proof of qualification (ABAO 900/1).

The following are forbidden:

--removing voltage from the electric power plants on the 3-meter pontoons during maintenance and repair work,

--filling the fuel tanks of the electric power plants with the engine running,

--storing fuel cans in the pontoons,

--smoking on the ferry or the pontoons.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

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2. Ibid., Fig. 907.18

## CAPTIONS

Fig. 1 Pile driver RF-78 in working position with two ram sections

Fig. 2 RF-78 in operation

Fig. 3 [Text missing]

Fig. 4 Treadway bridge over a water obstacle--built by bridge building sappers of the NPA and the Soviet Forces in Germany

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CSO: 8120/0731

## TYPES OF TEMPORARY MILITARY BRIDGES

East Berlin MILITAERTECHNIK in German No 3, 6 May 81 pp 131-133

[Text] Military Bridge Building

### Temporary Military Bridges

For securing the movement of troops, the construction of temporary bridges has not declined in importance, in spite of the existence of modern bridge-building equipment.

Temporary military bridges are structures of simple design<sup>1</sup>. They are built to eliminate interruptions in a route of march at an obstruction (water course, canal, gully or crossing); they are intended for short-term use by military traffic loads.

Wood in different stages of processing is the primary construction material in temporary bridges. Rolled-steel sections of different cross-sections can be processed and prepared using the appropriate technical methods and equipment from the units and squads, so that they can be used at any time in constructing military bridges. Even prefabricated concrete parts can be employed for certain elements in temporary bridges, if their strength factors, the proportion of reinforcements and its location in the finished part are known.

Temporary military bridges are divided into:

- low-level temporary bridges (low-water bridges),
- underwater bridges,
- high-level temporary bridges (high-water bridges).

Putting up the appropriate design of bridge is critically dependent on the tactical situation and the particular technical capabilities of the construction unit. The principle parts of a temporary military bridge are the superstructure and the foundation.

The superstructure consists of the support and driving surface and the load-bearing structure. The support and driving surface takes up the traffic load directly and distributes the resulting forces over the load-bearing structure. The support and driving surface is laid either perpendicular to the bridge axis or longitudinal to the axis on cross-beams.

The load-bearing structure is understood to include stretchers and/or headers, lane plates or nailed beams and/or trusses, which transmit the forces resulting from their own loads, traffic loads and additional loads into the foundation.

The foundation consists of end bearers and intermediate supports. Typical support elements for a temporary bridge are single or twin piling bents or trestles, pylon supports, log cribs and cassion supports. The selection of the supports must be made on the basis of the river bottom, the speed of the current, the depth of the water and the construction materials available.

#### Low-Level Temporary Bridges (Low-Water Bridges)

Low-level temporary bridges are built to free structural bridge depots and escort bridges during combat so that they can be sent into action again in additional operations. If there is insufficient structural bridge equipment available, they are also put up in combination with this equipment to bridge an obstacle or to replace out-of-commission structural bridge equipment. Important points to keep in mind are:

The organization and carrying out of bridge-building work in the shortest time possible while maintaining a consistently high level of productivity.

Erecting a reliable bridge structure which can be crossed by highly diverse military traffic loads, taking the appropriate class of bridge into consideration.

Ensuring a high degree of rigidity and a low level of vulnerability to the effects of conventional means of destruction and of nuclear weapons, as well as the capability of being able to replace damaged elements quickly.

Simplicity of construction, to ensure that the temporary bridge can be put up by the construction teams under a great variety of conditions.

With low-level construction bridges, a distinction is made between two classes:

--Class 25 Mp

--Class 60 Mp

They are usually built by engineer units which are equipped with the requisite means of mechanization.

The bearing spans of low-water bridges are short in comparison to those of high-water bridges. The bridges are simply constructed and intended for short periods of use. For these reasons, the break up of ice, high tides and inland water shipping traffic are rarely or never taken into account.

## Underwater Bridges

The advantage of underwater bridges is that they can scarcely be spotted by the enemy, either by immediate observation or by radar location equipment from the ground or from the air. If proper camouflage is used during construction of the bridge, while the equipment is being transferred, on the approach and departure routes and with constant monitoring of the hydrodynamic regulation of water flow, the element of surprise can be fully exploited in combat. An underwater bridge is also highly resistant to detonation and pressure waves.

Against these advantages must be weighed the disadvantages of a relatively long construction time and complicated assembly of the bridge structure, added to which are the hydrodynamic peculiarities of the water flow. For example, underwater bridges can only be built on piling supports with a current speed of up to 2 ms/sec and on frame supports with a current speed up to 1 m/sec, with a maximum water depth of 3 ms. The water level cannot exhibit any large fluctuations.

The deck of an underwater bridge is 0.3 to 0.5 ms under the surface of the water.

Underwater bridges are normally calculated to have a carrying capacity of 60 Mp and have a deck width of 4.2 ms.

### High-Level Temporary Military Bridges (High-Water Bridges)

In military thinking, high-level temporary bridges are classified as bridges that ensure the flow of all water levels and unhampered inland water traffic at normal water levels. Drift ice should be diverted in such a way that bridge bays are not damaged.

Like low-water bridges, high-water bridges are built of local materials and can have bearing spans of up to 40 ms.

High-level temporary bridges are used continuously by military loads over an extended period of time and with varying water levels. The bridge bays' dimensions are established in such a way that their safe load remains intact even with great load changes from the passage of military equipment. The class for high-level temporary bridges is usually set as 60 Mp. Bridge widths are designed for two-lane traffic, with the deck normally being 6 ms wide.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. "Militaerischer Brueckenbau: [Military Bridge Building], Berlin, 1974

## CAPTIONS

- Fig. 1 Cutting down trees for temporary bridge construction
- Fig. 2 Stripping bark from the trunks at the processing site
- Fig. 3 Cutting the stretchers to length with the frame saw
- Fig. 4 Additional processing of the stretchers and pilings at the processing site
- Fig. 5 Construction of a piledriver ferry by our Soviet comrades in arms
- Fig. 6 The first road lane plates are laid by our Soviet friends on the near bank
- Fig. 7 Floating a transport ferry loaded with road plates into position along the axis of the bridge and laying the plates
- Fig. 8 Meeting point: the middle of a water obstacle! That was the objective of engineers from a Soviet and an NPA unit, who jointly built a temporary bridge and thereby demonstrated their ability
- Fig. 9 Done!

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CSO: 8120/0731



DATA ON ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED IN BUDAPEST GIVEN

Budapest BUDAPEST in Hungarian No 1, 1984 pp 3-4

[Article by Dr Janos Penzes: "For Whom It Is Much Harder"; passages enclosed in slantlines were printed in italics]

[Text] Welfare policy is one of the fundamental instruments for the realization of social policy goals. Its task is to moderate existing inequalities in the living standards and living conditions of various population strata, groups, families and individuals by redistributing income. Thus from the living standard policy resolution of the 12th Congress of the MSZMP, it follows that during times of permanently moderate economic growth, it is especially important that the living standards and conditions of the severely disadvantaged strata--families with children, those starting careers, those with reduced working abilities, the elderly with low pensions, etc.--do not decline and deteriorate.

According to the present practice in the social welfare system, state and non-state, central and local, social and special interest activities, as well as the tasks of institutions and enterprises, are fixed. The councils have a preeminent role in the implementation of welfare policy tasks.

Our latest survey demonstrates the magnitude of the task and the demands made of welfare policy. One quarter of the population of Budapest--500,000 people--are over the working age. There are 476,000 pensioners. According to the 1980 census data, there are almost 20,000 families with three or more children, i.e., 3.6 percent of all families. More than 76,000 people receive disability pensions; there are 3,300 people over the age of 14 with physical and mental deficiencies; in 1982 there were 6,400 students studying in institutions for the education of the handicapped. The number of gypsies living here either permanently or temporarily is 60-65,000, about 3 percent of the capital's population.

Eighty-five percent of the population over the working age receives either a pension or support. The pension and support of one third of the pensioners does not exceed 2,000 forints. The majority of those people having low pensions are very elderly. Those with low pensions require increased and regular help and assistance. The state's pension policy provisions for regularly increasing low pensions also serve this end.

The so-called "old" pensions were increased beginning 1 September 1983. Pensions determined before 1959 were increased by 200 forints each month; certain disability pensions determined before 1 August 1983 were increased by 150 forints each month; similarly, old age and certain disability pensions determined between 1959 and 1970 were increased by 150 forints--to a maximum of 2,800 forints. At the same time, certain widow's and parent's pensions and also household allowances were increased.

A significant portion of the elderly live in families with their relatives. A majority of them require neither financial aid nor other care.

However, 40 percent of those over age 70 who comprise 10 percent of the capital's population have no relatives; many of them need financial support and other care.

/Home welfare care/ which was developed in the 1960s was established to aid the elderly who possess homes and suitable pensions but are unable to totally look after themselves. In 1983, 345 professional social workers and 2,572 volunteers provided home care for 10,200 elderly. Approximately 600 social activists assist in this work. The demand for home welfare care is growing; therefore, it is important to increase the number of professionals and volunteers.

A network of /daytime homes for the elderly/ has also been established in the capital city. These are utilized by those old people who primarily have problems with loneliness and who also require help in obtaining their meals.

Presently there are 59 daytime homes operating in the capital city; they care for 2,870 people. The organization of life in the homes is improving, and their operation is increasingly characteristic of that of a club. During the 6th 5-year plan, the Council of the Capital has designated the task of creating 35 new daytime homes and provisions for another approximately 200 elderly people.

At the end of 1982, the council was caring for close to 5,800, usually old people in the welfare homes, who were unable to totally provide for themselves. Twenty-four welfare homes are under the council's supervision. Among them, 10 in the capital's territory with a total of 27 sites ensure welfare care for approximately 2,700 elderly. According to the specifications of the 6th 5-year city development plan, the possibility of placement in a social home will be increased by 600 openings. In 1983 we fulfilled this target; thus, until the end of 1985 it will be possible to create new openings. Of those living in the homes, 70 percent are elderly, one third of whom require regular medical care and nursing. We take all of this into consideration in setting the terms. Presently, there are 6,450 places in organized social homes, and there are approximately 700-1,000 people waiting to be admitted, a majority of whom already have placement rulings.

The Council of the Capital is helping to solve the problems of the elderly by building /retirement homes/. Their creation was begun in the second half of the 1960s. The elderly who are able to look after themselves but require a community and certain kinds of help may be admitted here. In accordance with this, retirement homes where it is possible to realize a communal life and health care provisioning are presently also under construction.

In 1980 there were 370 pensioner apartments in the capital; in 1981, another 120 apartments were completed. We plan to construct approximately 600 apartments by the end of 1985. Both the care of pensioners and the number of apartments which are liberated in this way warrant the construction of more pensioner apartments in Budapest in the future.

A portion of the pensioners want suitable employment. A form of this is the work provided by the welfare employers and the institutions. In the capital, these institutions were not exclusively developed for the employment of the elderly and pensioners, but almost half of the 7,500 people employed are pensioners. About 90,000 people work in addition to receiving pensions. They comprise 19 percent of all pensioners. Not only is the pension supplement advantageous to those affected but the employment of pensioners also reduces the concerns caused by the labor shortage.

/Welfare assistance/ is an important means of providing diverse care for the elderly and pensioners. A portion of the elderly who live without a supporter and have a low income receive either regular or emergency assistance.

In 1982, 16,700 people in the capital received welfare assistance; 2,900 of these received assistance regularly. They received an average of 1,200 forints per month. Naturally, some of those receiving assistance were not elderly but required assistance because of their social situation. As of 1 January 1983, the assistance provided by the various council organizations and the Pension Payment Administration was increased by 100 forints per month. Thus, the amount of the emergency assistance rose to 1,850 forints, the regular welfare benefits also rose to 1,850 forints and similarly, the highest amount of the regular welfare assistance rose to 1,700 forints.

In 1980, the councils in Budapest allocated 64.5 million forints for welfare assistance; in 1983 it already rose to 94.3 million forints. This year as a result of the central government's provisions, the funds available for welfare assistance rose by 9.6 million forints.

The employers and the trade unions play an important part in supporting the elderly. A portion of the available trade union assistance funds are used for this purpose; vacations and employment in a club-like atmosphere are organized for pensioners.

Public medical care (drugs, therapeutic equipment) is free to those receiving regular welfare assistance within the /welfare services/ framework. Each year the Social Insurance Committee of the Trade Union Council of Budapest provides assistance--for medicines, etc.-- in about 5,000 cases for the needy.

The International Year of the Disabled (1981) specially focused attention on the problems of this group. It was decided that starting in 1982, 10-15 apartments per year would be developed in the housing projects under construction which would take into consideration the needs of the movement-impaired. On a KISZ initiative, the construction of a housing project for the movement-impaired was begun. In addition to significant social subsidies, the Council of the Capital also ensured significant amounts of assistance. The first 40 such apartments were completed in 1983, and more are now being built. A computer

factory was attached to the housing project; thus, there now exists the possibility of employment for the residents.

In 1981, a social movement was started to help the disabled. Workplace collectives and the residents of the capital contributed 13 million forints for this purpose to the council. We used this money to improve the lot of the disabled.

The /rehabilitation of the disabled and those with reduced working abilities/ and the creation of conditions for renewed employment are the fundamental tasks of the council. Experience has shown that if pensioning cannot come into consideration, people often gladly accept work with a 30-50 percent reduction in pay at their own enterprises rather than going to a different workplace. Employment rehabilitation is a complex, difficult task, but its further development is indispensable.

/Improving the living conditions/ of families with 3 or more children and satisfying their needs on the average social level also requires multidirectional work on the part of the councils. Of these, one of their most important needs is to obtain an apartment, or rather, the constant improvement of their housing conditions. On the basis of the housing policy programs, 7,311 families among those with 3 or more children received housing allocations during the 5th 5-year plan. The 1983 housing demand/renewals show that the proportion of families with 3 or more children among the petitioners declined. In 1981 and 1982 we satisfied another 2,830 housing, or rather exchange, needs. In 1983 the housing situation of more than 800 families was arranged. According to the adopted housing allocation program, we will satisfy the housing needs of families with 3 or more children within one year.

Our social aid to families with 3 or more children is manifold. But state measures concerning increases in the family allowance, the assistance provided to needy mothers having many children, the assistance ensured by employers and welfare subsidies belong in this category.

The financial situation, the family size and income per family member for young married couples under 35 is rather diverse. Because of their numbers and proportions, it was a long time before the councils could undertake a more rapid fulfillment of their housing needs. After 1971, the Council of the Capital improved the chances of young married couples in several respects. Of the apartments to be distributed, 20 percent were allocated to young married couples; after 1974, it was 40 percent and after 1978 it was 45 percent. They introduced and then expanded the system of temporary placements. Within the framework of this system, between 1975 and 1980, 10,700 young married couples received modestly equipped apartments, generally without amenities.

During the 5th 5-year plan, young married couples received a total of 25,134 apartments, including apartments exchanged (53 percent of the allocations). On the basis of the apartment allocation program which is presently in effect, the council committed itself to giving young married couples at least 50 percent of the apartment allocations. In 1983, 21,000 young married couples renewed or handed in applications. We were able to satisfy a half of the housing needs by permanent placements and the other half with temporary placements. It is



expected that of the presently registered applications, 6,700 will remain for the years 1986-87.

The 6th 5-year plan target of the construction of 2,100 single-room flats will also serve to improve the housing conditions of young married couples. In accordance with our executive committee's resolution, we undertook to allocate 100 apartments per year to young teachers; additionally, in accordance with the 1982 corporate decision, we will reserve approximately 300 single-room flats for young people, primarily those just starting careers. Of them, 88 are teachers and 80 are health care workers.

When permanent grants of state building sites are awarded, among others, young couples establishing families must be accorded advantages who, by renouncing their housing applications registered publicly at the council, wish to build their own housing using their own resources.

The proportion of disadvantaged among the gypsy population is greater than average because of their lifestyle and cultural level. In our country, the gypsies are classified as an ethnic group. Promoting the social adaptation, the elimination of the disadvantageous position and assimilation, or rather, integration of the gypsy population and other related tasks are designated by the party and state resolutions.

In Budapest the elimination of gypsy shanty towns was completed during the 5th 5-year plan. About 1,500-2,000 gypsies still live in buildings which do not meet social requirements. Their economic reorganization is proceeding according to plan. More than half of the capital's gypsies received better housing during the past decade as a result of the council's apartment allocations and construction activities. Despite the results even today their housing situation is significantly below the average; a larger portion of them live in apartments of only one room and a kitchen or with running water and lavatories only.

The education of children, the elimination of adult illiteracy as well as the completion of elementary school is the fundamental precondition for moderating the disadvantageous position. Already today, approximately 70 percent of the gypsy children of nursery school age attend nursery school. Compared to the beginning of the 1970s, the number of gypsy children attending nursery school has tripled. Approximately 4,000 gypsy children attend elementary school. Their schooling has come almost full circle. Despite this, hardly 1,000 finished high school and a total of 200 have attended college. Only about 10 percent of the males are skilled workers.

It is an unfavorable trend that the number of gypsies who are minors and receive state care has increased to almost 1,000. The number who have completed only a total of 1-4 grades may be estimated at several thousand, and it is similarly unfavorable that many of them are young people.

In the interests of more successful work, it is indispensable for the competent agencies of the councils to know the situation of the aged, the disabled, the mentally and physically deficient, the backward social classes, families and



social groups living under unfavorable circumstances, as well as the situation of children living in dangerous situations. For precisely this reason, it is necessary to improve investigative and preventive work as well as the definition of early and mid-range tasks.

It is generally known that the welfare policy tasks and welfare care, both nationally and in the capital, belong under the jurisdiction of several state and social agencies. Starting with this premise, it is of fundamental importance to improve the coordination of welfare policy activities, to reduce duplications, and to make the differentiation of subsidies dependent on social circumstances and need. All these could bring about the distribution of the available financial resources, welfare budget funds and other possibilities which are fairer and more appropriate to actual need.

One of the fundamental conditions for improving welfare policy activities is the further development of the management system, the purpose of which would be to make management within the council's apparatus more coordinated and unified. Organizational modernizations were introduced in the district council's apparatus starting from 1 January 1983 to allow the education, health care, and sports departments, which were merged, to deal with more welfare policy tasks, and also to improve coordination. At the same time, the social welfare and subsidization of foster children, families with 3 or more children, the elderly, gypsies, alcoholics and other disadvantaged groups came under the jurisdiction of the agencies. Naturally, the development of the organizational and management system and the welfare policy activities require that studies and proposals be worked out.

In the interests of more successful social welfare and care, prevention and the seeking out of those living in unfavorable social conditions and providing aid at the appropriate time are tasks of great social policy importance. This would make it possible to eliminate precipitating causes in time, thus enabling social welfare aid and care to become more effective.

Increased care for the elderly and mentally and physically deficient children, and improving the living conditions of the disabled requires the construction of more pensioner apartments, daytime homes, welfare homes and educational homes in the capital in the future.

Our articles on this subject which were published during the past few years follow:

Csaszar, Laszlo Nagy, "Wanted, a Father", No 3, 1981; "At the Edge of Their Age Groups", No 1, 1981; "Escape", No 3, 1981; "'I Didn't Have a Train Set'", No 7, 1983.

Csipan, Tibor, "Intellectuals Under 30", Nos 2-3, 1982.

Fekete, Dr Gyula, "Under the Line, I-III. (Subsistence Level Calculations on Three Generations in the Capital City)", Nos 7, 12, 1982; No 1, 1983.

Kertesz, Peter, "Iron-eater and the Rest", No 4, 1981; "Twenty Year-Old Retirees",

No 7, 1981; "They Say Hello And Make a Checkmark", No 8, 1981; "Doesn't Write, Doesn't Read", No 5, 1981.

Konczol, Csaba, "Supply Round The Clock", No 5, 1982.

Modra, Laszlo, "Intellectuals in the Capital City and in Rural Areas", No 8, 1981.

Pik, Katalin, "Do Gypsy Children Need Special Education?", No 12, 1981; "A Matter for the Provider of the Family", No 3, 1982.

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RELATIONS WITH FRG EVALUATED

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish No 17, 20 Jan 84 p 4

[Interview given by Professor Czeslaw Pilichowski to Leslaw Saidak: "West German Pressures Must Not Be Played Down:"]

[Text] In mid-December last year, Dr. Alois Mertes, secretary of state at the Bonn Foreign Affairs Ministry, made a statement in reply to a question from Dr. Karl Otto Lenz, a member of parliament for the Christian Democratic Party, concerning a German population in Poland and the legal status of the western and northern territories Poland regained in 1945. Professor Czeslaw Pilichowski, director of the Central Commission for Investigating Nazi Crimes in Poland and former secretary-general of the Polish Western Union, commented on this statement in an interview with the Polish press agency PAP.

[Pilichowski] Mertes' statement, which articulates German territorial and political revanchism, has had a negative reception. The problem essentially is that Mertes spoke for the West German Government in the Bundestag forum, which means his statement is an expression of this Government's official anti-Polish position.

In his statement, Mertes used certain legal terms regarding Polish western and northern territories which are incompatible with the 7 December 1970 Polish-West German agreement, such as "the territory along the Oder and Neisse between the western state boundary of the Polish People's Republic and the eastern state boundary of the German Reich (as of 31 December 1937) and the territory of Gdansk." Such a formulation of the legal status of Poland's western and northern territories is a misinterpretation of the Article 1 of the agreement, and diverges from a correct method of legal interpretation of international agreements.

On 7 December 1970, the West German Government signed an agreement with the Polish People's Republic on normalizing mutual relations as an international agreement in the name of the Federal Republic of Germany, and not in the name of the Third German Reich in its 31 December 1937 boundaries, nor in the name of Germany as a whole. Such a Reich or such a Germany has not

existed since Germany's unconditional surrender and since the Potsdam Agreement--which is binding also for the Federal Republic despite the fact that this state was created in 1949--took effect on 2 August 1945.

The agreement between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany was concluded by the West German Government and ratified by the Bundestag in full compliance with the 23 May 1949 West German constitution. One legal consequence of this particular position of the West German government is the obligation, specified in Article 25 of the West German constitution and in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention, that West Germany must not invoke provisions of its internal law to justify cases of misinterpretation or nonexecution of the Polish-West German agreement as an international agreement.

In his statement, Mertes also spoke of a "further existence of the German Reich in its 31 December 1937 boundaries" and of a "future peace treaty"; he talked about "the German nation's claims of restoring unity under conditions of freedom" and on such a "binding definition of territorial goals with a view to a future peace treaty which would transgress the territories of the two states in Germany together with Berlin." Hence, it follows that Mertes totally defies the legal consequences of the Potsdam Agreement and international agreements such as that between Poland and West Germany or between West Germany and the German Democratic Republic. These agreements allow no room for such a misleading and anti-Polish legal interpretation as that the West German government made in the aforementioned statements.

[Question] The Polish-West German agreement makes no mention of a "peace treaty with Germany."

[Answer] Indeed. Article 7 of the 26 May 1952 agreement on relations between West Germany and the three [Western] powers contains no reference to a "peace treaty" but only to a "peaceful regulation in a treaty to be concluded between former enemy countries and Germany as a whole." The Potsdam Agreement regulated the matter of "establishing peace," not the matter of "a peace treaty with Germany." The 6 July 1950 agreement between Poland and the German Democratic Republic or the 7 December 1970 agreement between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany created no new legal status for Poland's western border on the Oder and the Neisse, but only reaffirmed the legal status which the four powers had established in the Potsdam Agreement. Besides, the Polish-West German agreement is an international accord which does not require "a peace treaty with Germany," for Germany existed neither after 8 May 1945, nor does it exist today.  
[as published]

[Question] To return to the Mertes statement, he said that of "the 11 million inhabitants" of Poland's western and northern territories "1 million are Germans," which is "9 percent of the total population living in territories on the Oder and the Neisse."

[Answer] He also said West Germany "has a duty to protect these Germans," that West Germany "insists on realizing these people's ethnic rights, in

particular on respecting their native language and using it, especially in church and school," and that at least 120,000 Germans from territories on the Oder and the Neisse want to settle in West Germany."

Mertes includes among these people also those "Germans" who live "in the eastern part of Upper Silesia and other regions of Poland" and presents an extremely debatable estimate of the German population in the western and northern territories before 1939, during World War II and afterwards. He also classes as Germans Lutheran Poles from Pomerania and the Mazury region who were, and are, fervent Polish patriots.

Mertes' population estimates are totally incompatible with historical truth. The truth is, according to the 17 May 1939 census, that the territories in the north and the west which Poland regained had been inhabited by 8.4 million people, of which 1.3 million were an indigenous Polish population and 7.1 million Germans or Germanized people. After 1945, Polish authorities recognized, after verification, the indigenous Polish population as [ethnic] Poles. These people were Poles who constituted a national minority in pre-war Germany. They were active in the Union of Poles in Germany and other Polish associations or youth organizations and attended Polish schools. They were harrassed by Nazi authorities. In August 1939, many of them were deported to Nazi concentration camps, and throughout the war they were persecuted by the Nazis. They are now Polish citizens, not West German citizens. Mertes' contention that 1.1 million Germans live in Poland is fantastic, whereas West Germany's extension of its legislation concerning unified German citizenship to Poles who are Polish citizens and granting West German consular care to these people are legal fictions. This type of West German legal claim can be classified as West German legal aggression against Poland.

[Question] In a book called "Polish-German Encounters, 1945-1958," published in Wurzburg in 1960, authors of a report concerning Warmia and the Mazury region write, "The Union's first secretary, a Pole, Dr. Czeslaw Pilichowski, ... was doing everything possible to make life easier for the German population which he called the Mazurian tribe."

[Answer] This is true. I was then secretary-general of the Polish Western Union. I was indeed doing that, because the point was to incorporate the indigenous Polish--not German--population in Warmia and Mazury, in Pomerania and Silesia, in all Polish territories, into a unified Polish national and state body. After all, Poland's return to its native Piast [dynasty] lands in the west and the north was a consequence of these lands' Polish character and of the survival for centuries of a sense of Polishness among the indigenous Polish population in these territories; these 1.3 million Silesians, Lower Silesians, Pomeranians, Warmians and Mazurians could, once Poland regained lands on the Oder and along the Baltic coast, return to their Polish motherland.

On the strength of the Potsdam Agreement and in keeping with the 20 November 1945 Allied Control Council plan, 2,275,015 Germans were resettled in Germany. This was done because 4.5-5 million Germans had



left the territories on the Oder and the Lausitzer Neisse during hostilities or during the first months after them.

Chapter XIII of the Potsdam Agreement stipulated, "Resettlements operations should be carried out in an orderly and humane manner." And this was how it was done, insofar as the Polish state was responsible.

Mertes' estimations of the German population in Poland are deliberate falsifications of history. In Poland, there is no German minority which would require "protection" from the Federal Republic and which would like to settle, as Germans, in West Germany. However, Mertes "proves" his contention by invoking--as concerns those alleged 120,000 "Germans" who are said to intend to go to West Germany--institutions such as the German Red Cross, the Union of Expellees or the [Bad] Homburg-based Federal Restitution Office [Bundesausgleichsamt]. Alas, the German Red Cross is also among them. The question arises then, what is this humanitarian institution's function concerning "the Germans in Poland"? Is it equally anti-Polish and revanchist?

[Question] The Mertes statement is not an exception to the revanchist outlook of some parties, ministries and offices in West Germany. Would you recall recent moves and actions hostile to Poland?

[Answer] One of these was the 29 January 1983 statement by West German Interior Minister Friedrich Zimmermann concerning [West Germany's] refusal to recognize Polish and European borders as definitive. Further, there was Zimmermann's position on the "German problem" as an open question for Europe and on the appurtenance of the territories on the Oder, the Lausitzer Neisse and along the Baltic coast which Poland regained in the Potsdam Agreement to the territory of the German Reich in its 1937 boundaries; this position was endorsed by Chancellor Helmut Kohl on 8 February last year. Next, there is Zimmermann's 13 February 1983 ordinance on preparing and publishing so-called documentation [as published] devoted, as he put it, to "crimes committed during the expulsion of Germans from the eastern territories," and on preparing an expert opinion on pertinent international legal and internal West German penal provisions regarding "expulsion" and the concern of "expulsion" itself as a term denoting "the uprooting of the eastern German population and its sufferings." This matter was given much attention by Mertes in his statement, who attributed it not to Poland alone, but also to the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

Let me further recall the campaign by so-called German expellees who sent letters to Poles living in the western and northern territories, letters in which it is purported that Polish authorities are not entitled to sell or donate land or property in Poland's territories on the Oder and along the Baltic coast, because, it is alleged, "the expelled Germans and, by their authorization, the German Reich in its 1937 boundaries" are the sole legitimate owners of these lands.

Finally, let me recall an initiative made early this year by the Inner-German Ministry, which is headed by Heinrich Windelen, to publish an official map of Germany in its 1937 boundaries.

[Question] These West German government moves are the most conspicuous signs of anti-Polish activities in recent months, but these must not be considered in isolation from West Germany's overall political line, should they?

[Answer] Quite so. Ever since the Federal Republic's foundation in 1949, such anti-Polish moves were particularly conspicuous when "Christian Democrats" or "free democrats" [F.D.P.] were in power in West Germany. Internal laws in West Germany include more than 50 laws and other legal acts which are incompatible with the letter and spirit of agreements with East European countries, in particular with the Polish-West German agreement on normalizing mutual relations. This is not surprising. This is the same platform endorsed by [first West German Chancellor] Konrad Adenauer, which, to be honest, is now implemented by peaceful means but is equally dangerous to Poland's security and to peace in Europe.

It is impossible to ignore that the time following the Helsinki and the Madrid conferences was used by West Germany to push its policies in directions quite different from those established in the CSCE Final Act of 1 August 1975, and in the final document of the Madrid conference signed on 6 September 1983, or from the program for the Stockholm conference. Yet, the West German government signed all of these documents. The question arises, then, when signing these documents, was the West German Government acting in goodwill or treating them as propaganda papers?

With the international situation as it is now, there is a danger that West Germany will push for the revision of the political status quo in Europe, aided by the imperialistic dreams of German nationalists for a political unification of Germany in the 1937 boundaries; this danger must not be played down. This would mean playing down danger to world peace and to Poland's security.

CSO: 2600/664

## RESULTS OF CIVIL DEFENSE SYMPOSIUM REPORTED

Warsaw PRZEGLAD OBRONY CYWILNEJ in Polish No 12, Dec 83 pp 12-13

[Unsigned article: "Symposium at the Inspectorate of the Nation's Civil Defense" under the rubric "From the Life and Activities of Civil Defense"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface in the original source]

[Text] /The place of civil defense theory in the system of military sciences as well as its subject matter and structure were the topics of a symposium held at the Inspectorate of the Nation's Civil Defense (IOCK) in Warsaw under the auspices of the General Staff Academy of the Polish Army (ASG WP) and the IOCK. The participants in the symposium included representatives of the Secretariat of the National Defense Committee, the Board for Extra-Military Training, the Inspectorate of Territorial Defense and Home Army, the Inspectorate of the Nation's Civil Defense, the Main Civil Defense Training Center and the ASG WP.

The symposium was opened by Brig Gen Jozef Cwetsch, Chief of the IOCK and Deputy Chief Inspector of Territorial Defense. A report on studies being done in the systematics of military sciences and theory of civil defense was presented by Brig Gen Zbigniew Czerwinski. He recalled at the outset that Div Gen Boleslaw Chocha had pointed to the need for research into civil defense theory in his book "Obrona terytorium kraju" [Defense of the Nation's Territory], published in 1974. The issue of civil defense was considered as part of research conducted at the ASG WP and elaborated in the study by Col Ret Professor Dr Andrzej Madejski, "Basic Problems of the Systematics of Military Science," published in 1978, as well as in his book "Nauka wojenna" [Military Science], published in 1980. In both of his works Col Ret Professor Dr Madejski placed the civil defense theory within the table of the pertinent military sciences in accordance with a proposal for dividing disciplines into specialties. Gen Czerwinski said that on the basis of that systematics detailed studies of the civil defense theory had been launched but could not be completed owing to the well-known events in the country. Now the conditions for completing them exist--the conditions for determining jointly and in more detail the structure of that discipline.

Next, Gen Czerwinski justified the need for a theoretical determination of the structure of Civil Defense as well as for bringing order into the concepts of theory developed in this respect so far and assessing the whole of the related activities of the organs and forces of civil defense so far. Among other things, he said that this:

--would serve to determine more clearly the significance of Civil Defense to national defense in general;

--would show which organs and institutions already are or should be responsible for the development of particular Civil Defense specialties and the solution of various problems of theory and practice;

--could facilitate determining the most expedient structure of organs and institutions and deploy properly resources in the broadest meaning of the word, that is, personnel, material, financial, etc. resources;

--would serve to select directions of special effort in defense work while implementing Civil Defense tasks;

--would make possible a systemic approach to the planning and conduct of scientific research into problems relating to practical activities in the field of Civil Defense;

--could also be of importance to the proper implementation of other projects, and not only organizational-functional or research projects at that but also planning and training projects intended, e.g. to modify instructional and training curriculums.

Concluding his report, Gen Czerwinski declared that the systematization of the structural concepts of Civil Defense will serve to operate with them and enable theoreticians and practitioners to gain better mutual understanding, and, further, that it results in a certain--both practical and theoretical--sense in the division of spheres of interests, subjects or aspects of research into the scientific discipline.

In his turn, Col Ret Professor Dr Andrzej Madejski briefly discussed problems of the military sciences, stressing that civil defense should be part of the system of these sciences. The role and place of the civil defense theory in military science were presented in the paper by Col Docent Dr Tadeusz Stawski, Deputy IOCK Chief. At the outset he briefly recapitulated the genesis of the formation of civil defense (CD) and the tremendous importance of CD to the defense system of the state. He said that the direct determinants of CD development in Poland are the goals formulated in the decree on the universal duty of defense and the country's economic possibilities. The formation, development and elaboration of CD have been accompanied by the need to solve problems in a scientific manner, which has resulted in developing the theory of CD. As a basis for the related discussion, let us recall the latest views represented by Army Gen Aleksandr Altunin, Chief of the USSR CD, Col Ret Prof Andrzej Madejski and the General Staff Academy, as well as the views, of the CD directing elements, that have been implemented in practice.

According to Altunin, "The role of civil defense in the science of warfare consists in that, on the basis of the assumptions of the general theory of the science of warfare, it deals with a special section concerning the defense of the rear. This is a new section of the science of warfare, which arose as a result of the development of means of armed struggle and views as to their present-day application."

On considering the question of whether the theory of civil defense belongs in a particular scientific group, he proposed isolating (distinguishing) it as an autonomous discipline having the "rights" of a group of sciences. His reasoning was that civil defense is not supposed to conduct a defensive armed struggle and hence is not a branch of the armed forces. The purpose of CD is that of a broadly conceived rear which supports such struggle only indirectly.

If, on the other hand, it is decided that CD theory should be part of some existing group of sciences, then of course the only suitable group is the military sciences.

Col Dr Stanislaw Grzmil, Commandant of the Main CD Personnel Training Center, devoted his speech to the topic of research into civil defense theory. He stated at the outset that civil defense theory began to evolve already during World War I. Thus, in this country the first to evolve was the theory of passive anti-aircraft defense during the 1918-1939 period, followed by the TOPL (Local Anti-Aircraft Defense) theory during the 1945-1965 period, the PS (General Civil Defense) theory during 1966-1973, and since 1973 the CD theory. The subject matter of research into CD theory is the system of activities constituting a component part of the state's defense efforts to protect the rear in all ways. The speaker presented a structural schema of the subject matter of civil defense theory as well as methods for determining research topics. He included the following among element of research into CD theory: topic of research, purpose of research, tasks, and actions as well as factors assuring the implementation of these actions. This research can be carried out by either the in-series or parallel approach. In conclusion, Col Dr S. Grzmil declared that the subject matter of research into CD theory comprises both theory and practice as well as assessment of experience and forecasting.

Col Docent Dr Daniel Kubajewski discussed the present status and directions of evolution of the internal structure of civil defense theory (the complete text of his paper is published on p 1 of this issue).

Another paper on the structure of civil defense theory was presented by Brevet Col Feliks Mackowiak of the IOCK. His view was that civil defense theory is a discipline of the science of warfare rather than of military sciences. The purpose and tasks for which CD was established in Poland are based on the following principal disciplines of civil defense theory: the general theory of CD, principles for protecting the population, principles for enhancing the preservation of the national economy, principles for the conduct of rescue activities, principles for directing civil defense, CD training methods and supplies and technical services within CD. On presenting the schema of the internal structure of CD, he observed that this is an open question requiring creative discussion.

Subsequently during the symposium eight communications were presented.

Lt Col Dr Eng Stanislaw Augustyn briefed those present on CD activities in the Western countries. In his opinion no major importance is attached in the West European countries to the structure of CD theory and the place of CD in the system of military sciences or sciences of warfare. However, this does not prevent these countries from conducting utilitarian CD studies and establishing well-organized and equipped CD. He cited as an example the construction of CD shelters in Switzerland, where 75 percent of the population (including



the entire urban population) is provided with space in shelters with filtering and ventilating facilities. Other examples he cited were the establishment of the world's second CD ministry in Italy (the first was established in New Zealand) and the formation of a "national civil defense service" as well as the lively activities of the International Civil Defense Organization which has, during the 25 years of its existence, organized, among other things, 9 world CD conferences, 14 exhibitions of CD equipment and 2 international radiological defense conferences as well as training seminars for managerial and expert personnel.

Col Jerzy Jaworski discussed the research conducted by the CD Inspectorate. The topics researched include protection of the population, water and food; a universal alert and alarm system; the detection of nuclear explosions and radioactive contamination; the organization and conduct of rescue activities, etc. Also being studied is the process of forecasting, planning and implementing CD tasks on an overall scale. The findings of these studies serve to improve further the preparations for the civil defense of our country.

Col Dr Eng Jerzy Szymczak presented the problem of utilizing the studies conducted while counteracting the consequences of natural disasters and catastrophes. He proposed that such studies be conducted under the direction of the IOCK with the participation of the Main Civil Defense Personnel Training Center (COSK) and all local civil defense inspectorates and in cooperation with the interested commands of branches of the armed forces and MON [Ministry of National Defense] services and all the research institutions and ministries participating in one way or another in implementing tasks associated with the conduct of rescue activities and the elimination of the consequences of natural disasters. He also proposed that legal provisions be issued to regulate the presence of research teams within emergency rescue groups and that the transmission in report form of all comments, suggestions and observations of a cognitive nature to the IOCK be made a binding principle. Such reports would serve as a basis for broad studies followed by a definitive formulation of recommendations and their implementation.

Brevet Maj Andrzej Kurant dealt in his communication with the problem of methods of CD theory research during exercises. He suggested that the General Staff Academy's "Principles of Research Into Military Theory During Exercises" be used as a basis, on adapting it to the specifics of civil defense. In his opinion, the most suitable methods for research into CD theory would be observations and experiments as well as critical analysis of the resulting reports, along with polling and intelligence gathering. The teams conducting such research during CD exercises should uncover the operating patterns of civil defense, formulate on this basis pertinent laws and principles, and work out scientific principles for practical solution as regards protecting the population and national property and organizing the conduct of rescue activities.

Brevet Maj A. Kurant suggested that the CD organs should work out their own principles for research into CD theory during exercises as well as for cooperation in eliminating the consequences of disasters and breakdowns.

Col Dr Eng Remigiusz Lampka, in his communication on the operational art of civil defense as a scientific specialty of CD theory, stated that, among other things, civil defense involves the conduct of activities of an operational

nature, e.g. rescue operations and population-dispersing operations. He proposed that the operational art of civil defense be isolated as a separate discipline of CD theory.

Brevet Col Eugeniusz Lewinski justified the adoption of the term "civil defense tactics." The subject matter of research into such tactics would be activities intended to counteract the effects of enemy action (natural disasters and catastrophes) and reduce and eliminate their consequences, that is, "preventive actions" and rescue actions. He proposed that the general tactics of civil defense be isolated [as a separate discipline].

Brevet Col Jan Krzywonos discussed the organization of the training of CD managerial and other personnel as well as of the civilian population. He devoted much attention to the training of youth and, in conclusion, offered a number of recommendations for intensifying and elevating the level of training activities. Among other things, he proposed the preparation of an appropriate field training base in the newly established inter-province CD personnel training centers; the drafting of new instructions, regulations, textbooks and popular brochures; and a broader use of the mass media to popularize CD problems.

Brevet Col Eng Antoni Czekatowski described how technology is utilized for CD needs. He declared that civil defense makes use of technical-military equipment, equipment produced by the national economy, and specialized equipment made to order for CD. Discussing the utilization of the equipment available in various fields of the national economy, especially in agriculture, he proposed that the development of new types of that equipment should be geared to CD requirements. This would render superfluous having to adapt it to civil defense tasks following its production. He also proposed that civil defense technology be isolated as a separate discipline within CD theory.

In the discussion that followed the presentation of these papers and communications, six officers took the floor. They commented on the place of civil defense theory in the science of warfare as well as on various aspects of the related research.

In his closing speech Brig Gen Jozef Cwetsch, Chief of the IOCK and Deputy Main Inspector of Territorial Defense, stressed that the symposium served to confront the views of theoreticians and practitioners concerning civil defense theory and provided many valuable recommendations. He proposed that a team consisting of members of the ASG, the IOCK and the COSK OC [Main Civil Defense Training Center] be established in order to assess the results of the symposium and work out the directions of further research into civil defense theory. He further proposed that in the future joint symposia be held once a year. He thanked all those present for their participation in this useful meeting and the ASG for the initiative in organizing it.

1386

CSO: 2600/660

## CIVIL SERVICE EXECUTIVES PROFILED BY AGE, SEX, TENURE, EDUCATION

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 16 Jan 84 pp 1, 2

[Article by CH: "Portrait of Civil Service Executives"]

[Text] The questionnaire which was given at the beginning of last year to the executives of the various ministries and central offices to test their knowledge of the principles of our economic reform has fulfilled the hoped-for expectations, in spite of the conflicting opinions of the interested parties. It allowed a determination of the level of knowledge on the subject of the reform, and we must admit that the results came out favorably for the people answering the questionnaire.

Let us recall that in its first stage the people subjected to the "reform test" were the leading cadres of 28 ministries and central bureaus, starting from the heads of the departments and ending with their directors. Information obtained as a by-product of that test and pertaining to the age, tenure in leading positions, and education level of the executives made it possible for Grzegorz Skarzynski of the Institute of Cadre Management and Training to draw a picture of the executive leadership, a kind of group portrait.

Men make up the dominant group in this picture. They are the holders of almost 80 percent of all the leading positions. There are only 588 women in this picture out of a total of 2314 people comprising the leading community. The average age of the leaders is quite advanced. It is about 50 years of age.

The level of education of the leading cadre of the central departments is high. The majority are graduates of colleges of economics and technical engineering. The third largest group is identified as law degree holders.

The characteristic feature of all the "chiefs" is their short tenure in their present leading positions. For about half of the executives of the central offices, it does not exceed 3 years. In almost all the departments the dominant group is about 46 to 55 years old. It is only in the Commerical Bank [Bank Handlowy] and the Headquarters of the Office of Geodesy and Cartography where the largest group consists of people between the ages of 36 and 45. In the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Services the prevailing age of the leading cadre members is 56 to 65.

The highest education level is demonstrated by the executives of the office of the Council of Ministers, the Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers, the Finance Ministry, Ministry of Chemical Industry, Ministry of Light Industry, and the Main Inspectorate of Energy Administration. At the same time a certain part of the cadre does not have higher education. The lowest education is represented by the cadre of the Commercial Bank, where almost 25 percent of the people have at most a high school diploma. In the remaining central offices, the educational structure is more or less the same: 3 percent with high school education, 3 percent not completed college education, 90 percent with college education, 4 percent with doctoral degrees.

In 12 of the central offices the majority of people in leading positions have been holding them for less than 1 1/2 years. In another 14 offices the dominant tenure has been between 1 1/2 and 5 1/2 years and only in the Central Office of Geology and in the Main State Commercial Inspectorate has the majority of the leading cadre been holding their present positions for over 5 1/2 years.

12470

CSO: 2600/643

## CHURCH'S ROLE SINCE END OF 'RENEWAL' OUTLINED

Bonn AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE, #6/84 in German 11 Feb 84 pp 3-15

[Abstract of an article by Dieter Bingen, research associate at the Federal Institute for East Bloc and International Studies, Cologne: "Die Rolle der katholischen Kirche Polens nach dem Ende der 'Erneuerung' " (The Role of the Polish Catholic Church Following the End of the "Renewal"), in AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE, a supplement to the Bonn weekly, DAS PARLAMENT, 11 Feb 84]

[Text] After the proclamation of martial law, the Catholic church maintained the continuity of its public activities in the sense of mediation and moderation. In the meantime, power struggles within the state and party apparatus also affected the relationship between the church and the authorities. The church found itself increasingly on the firing line as a starting point for actions directed against martial law. In view of this, Primate Glemp, the Pope and Prime Minister Jaruzelski were striving for a formula of compromise which was to make possible the second papal visit as a moral and national authority, or for the political leadership as holder of the power monopoly.

From the papal visit, both government and the party hoped for significant progress in the "normalization" of the political situation, enhancement of the government's national and international prestige, and a final political neutralization of the church--from the very same Pope who, according to general conviction, indirectly had a decisive influence on the politicization of society and the clergy. The Polish church longed for a conciliatory effect and moral uplift on society from the papal visit. The opposition wanted moral support for its resistance against the political leadership.

But what can the church really accomplish at a time when economic and social tensions in Poland continue to grow, when the government refuses "authentic" dialogue, and resignation predominates in large segments of the population? Probably the pastoral letters and communiques of the Polish bishops, interventions to avoid "the worst," and efforts to ensure in the long term one's own public position in negotiations with the government, show the only viable course for the church in Poland.

What is striking today, in the post-"Solidarity" period, is the impotence of the church with regard to visible change in political conditions in Poland. In the short term, the church is not a threat to the system; in a certain sense, it has a stabilizing effect on the system. This is confirmed by the course of the papal visit, the lack of results in the sense of opening up a new dialogue between government and society, and the latest arrangements between church and state.



## CYCLICAL RENEWAL OF POPULAR UNREST PROJECTED

Bonn AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE, B6/84 in German 11 Feb 84 pp35-45

[Abstract of an article by Kiaus Reiff, chief of European section of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn: "Polen--unser unruhiger Nachbar" (Poland--Our Uneasy Neighbor), in AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE, a supplement to the Bonn weekly, DAS PARLAMENT, 11 Feb 84]

[Text] At present, Poland has to struggle with enormous social and economic problems. The number of low-income and lowest-income families rises steadily, which means that price reforms linked to increases will seriously threaten more and more people in the future. Despite an excellent harvest in 1983, the supply situation has hardly improved, since a large part of Polish agricultural products is exported to provide the country with urgently needed foreign currency. Compared with other countries, Western or even socialist, absolute agricultural productivity is very low.

The reform currently under way, which also touches upon all other sectors of the Polish economy, hardly arouses any optimism in Poland since one suspects that the economic bureaucracy is blocking and hindering most of the efforts. It is doubtful whether the situation can be changed substantially through the planned reorientation of Poland's foreign trade toward CEMA and developing countries, given the present entwinement with Western markets.

At the present time, the Catholic Church in Poland must be seen as the most important social force. So far, the new trade unions with their 3.7 million members have not attained the hoped-for organizational success, particularly since the government gives them little chance to gain status. "Solidarity" must be considered past history, and the Polish United Workers' Party has great difficulty in coping with their own bureaucracy and internal opposition. At present, only the Polish Farmers' Party is gaining ground, both with their members and with the government.

In summary, it must be stated that today hardly anyone in Poland is hopeful that the announced reforms will bring about positive changes. Should one venture a halfway appropriate prognosis on Poland's future road, only one thing can be said: that our uneasy neighbor surely will lose patience again, very soon. The intervals between disturbances in Poland are becoming shorter and shorter.

## RAKOWSKI DEBATES HIS BOOK WITH SCIENTISTS

LD022138 Warsaw PAP in English 2015 GMT 2 Mar 84

[Text] Warsaw, 2 March (PAP)--Poland's vice premier Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski has won a massive audience among Poznan's scientific and student circles for a public debate over his latest book entitled "Trudny Dialog" (Difficult Dialogue) comprising texts of his public pronouncements, articles and interviews from the end of 81 till the first months of 1983.

Addressing the debaters in Poznan Polytechnic (Institute of Technology) who had aired their veiws in the book for five hours last night, the vice-premier stressed that neither the lapse of time nor the development of events had undermined the rightness of most of his assessments and views published in the book.

The vice premier underlined the significance of the issues put forward by the participants in the meeting and assured them that moves will be made, if possibilities emerge, towards an essential improvement in the living standards of the Polish scientific circles and intelligentsia.

Referring to his earlier opinions on the role and responsibilities facing the Polish intelligentsia after August 1980, the vice premier said that many of its representatives had refused to acknowledge at that time the phenomena dangerous to Poland, and had not thought in the state's terms.

"We demand from all university teachers and teachers in general not to bring up getting people in a spirit of resistance to their own country. The important thing is to bring them up in a spirit of realism, to make them aware of how complicated the world is," said Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski.

Next the vice premier reviewed the attitude held by some members of the student community towards the law on higher education which had been passed in a difficult political situation. He said that some considered it as a sign of the authorities' weakness, and that, subsequently, they believe that the rights it has granted [words indistinct] abused for the struggle against the socialist state.

"This is a gross misunderstanding. We shall not give our consent to the opposition activities in higher schools pursued by some research workers. It cannot be a "normal" thing in this difficult time for Poland. We must secure peace and order in Poland in the conditions of international competition, growing distance

and technological gap, in the time of removing the sources of the crisis. The discussion proved that society wants strong authority, this is what it wants indeed," Rakowski said.

Referring to the problems put forward in the course of the debate the vice premier recalled that numerous areas of this country's policies had been rationalised. "We present issues to the society with great sincerity. We scrupulously follow the voices and opinions presented in people's letters, during conferences, consultations, etc.

"As regards public opinion polls," the vice premier stressed, "we must be more courageous when it comes to publishing their findings, also those unfavorable for us.

"We have no reason whatsoever to beautify reality. Information on the government work and its objectives is now very comprehensive.

"Our political [word indistinct] does not know "pre-arranged" meetings: every day the authorities confront the reality face to face," said Vice Premier Rakowski.

In conclusion he referred [word indistinct] the issues integration. He said that as the Polish nation had experienced a deep shock, the process of integration needs a long time to consolidate and become sufficiently satisfying.

CSO: 2020/73

## BRIEFS

SOLIDARITY ACTIVISTS ARRESTED--Warsaw, 22 Feb--Security service operatives of the voivodship internal affairs office in Piotrkow Trybunalski have traced down a six-strong group carrying out anti-state activities at an iron foundry in Koluszek. Members of the group, including factory commission chairman and secretary of the former Solidarnosc Union, took up illegal activities immediately after the proclamation of martial law. They printed and distributed bulletins and other publications calling for production disorganization as well as aiming at undermining prestige of the factory management. They organized protest actions in the foundry in December 1981 and May 1982, among others, and incited foundry personnel to boycott the elections to worker self-management bodies. The group was financed through illegal collections of money among the foundry workers. Security officials found in the possession of the group two typewriters, one primitive printing set, one copier, matrices, carbon paper and printing paper as well as a host of electric appliances including mercury discharge lamps, heaters, coils, wires, valves, grinding stones and other objects stolen from the foundry. The six, including two women, have been placed under investigative department of the voivodship office for internal affairs (WUSW) in Piotrkow Trybunalski conducts preparatory proceedings under the supervision of the voivodship prosecutor's office. [Text] [LD221801 Warsaw PAP in English 1424 GMT 22 Feb 84]

KUBIAK-PARTY LECTURERS MEETING--On 9 February at the headquarters building of the PZPR Central Committee a meeting was held between Professor Hieronim Kubiak, member of the Central Committee Politburo, and party lecturers working for the Central Committee and the voivodship party committees. The meeting was called in order to review the conclusions drawn from the study on the crises which have occurred in the history of People's Poland and the problem of insuring that these crises will not be repeated. Hieronim Kubiak responded to numerous questions and statements made by the lecturers. The meeting was chaired by Janusz Janicki, deputy director of the PZPR Central Committee Ideological Department. [Text] [Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 10 Feb 84 p 2]

CSO: 2600/735

# SWISS PAPER DISCUSSES SOVIET-ROMANIAN RELATIONS

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 3 Feb 84 p 3

[Report by "R. St.": "Soviet Energy Supplies to Romania--New Stand on Counterarming?--Situation in Bucharest Following Gromyko's Visit"]

[Text] Vienna, 1 February--The as yet very sparse reports about the 3-day official visit to Romania of a Soviet delegation headed by Politburo member and Foreign Ministry Gromyko so far do not permit any substantial conclusions about what actually happened in Bucharest. In a report on the occasion of Gromyko's departure, the Romanian news agency AGERPRES merely notes that both sides described the exchange of views as useful, open and friendly and entertained the wish and hope that it might contribute to the further development of the friendly relations and cooperation between the respective parties, countries and peoples. The last round of talks was devoted once more to international political questions. Previously also economic and ideological problems had been discussed. Among those accompanying Gromyko were the permanent Soviet CEMA representative, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Talyzin, and the Central Committee secretary responsible for party relations, Rusakov. In light of the fact that state and party head Andropov is not fit to travel, the Moscow delegation must be described as extraordinarily high ranking, and the talks as correspondingly significant.

## Relief for Romanian Balance of Payments

The brief announcement does not exactly redound in cordiality. In addition to such standard formulas as "fraternal and comradely spirit," one primarily misses the word "agreement." It is still possible that it should be considered a temporary communication and that what is missing will be made up in a detailed version. On the occasion of past meetings between Ceausescu and leading Soviet officials, it did happen, however, that TASS and AGERPRES gave different accounts of some details of the talks. The meeting between Ceausescu and Gromyko had started with a bang on Monday, when it became known that the Soviet Union was prepared to supply Romania with petroleum, coal and natural gas at preferred CEMA prices (in exchange for Romanian industrial goods). Though the 1.5 metric tons of petroleum mentioned do not cover Romanian needs, they provide fairly strong relief for the Romanian balance of payments in hard currency. Previously Bucharest has received no Soviet petroleum at all in the clearing system. Unlike all other Warsaw Pact



countries, Romania did not accept the conditions tied to such supplies by Moscow. In the eyes of observers of the meeting, the question was how and to what extent Ceausescu would reward Moscow's concession. According to information available from Bucharest so far, both Gromyko and Ceausescu stuck to their stands. Gromyko in his banquet speeches and at a demonstration in Bucharest hardly deviated from the tenor of his hardline speech in Stockholm. Calling on the United States to change its policies, he stated that Moscow was prepared to resume the dialogue as soon as Washington withdraws the already stationed medium-range missiles from West Europe. The Romanian press, on the other hand, the day before had stressed the need for resuming the Geneva talks and expressed the view that all missiles stationed in Europe should be removed and destroyed.

Now, the term "all missiles stationed in Europe" appears to be flexible in Romanian. Ceausescu used it as long as a year ago. At that time he urged the Soviets to withdraw the SS-20's from the western Soviet Union in order to prevent the NATO counterarming. When he additionally talked about destruction, this is probably meant as an idealistic long term aim. In the course of 1983 Bucharest then proceeded in small steps to recognizing the existing reality in the Soviet Union. While exhortations directed to the alliance partner became increasingly weak, those directed to NATO remained the same. Recently the Romanians have already made it unofficially known that the withdrawal of missiles being demanded from both sides concerns Pershing and cruise missiles in West Europe, but in East Europe only SS-21's and SS-22's stationed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia after counterarming. If this should turn out to be Bucharest's new official stand, the Soviet economic concession would make sense.

#### Trudeau's Arrival

Shortly after Gromyko's departure, Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau arrived in Bucharest, his third stop during his trip to East Europe. Whereas the chairman of the GDR Council of State, Honecker, at least had a few nice things to say about his plan for a conference of the nuclear powers, the leadership in Prague remained cool. In the opinion of state and party head Husak, the United States bears sole responsibility for the tensions in the world. In Bucharest, Trudeau has the privilege of being the first Western head of government to subject the new Romanian position in East-West relations to a critical examination.

8790

CSO: 2300/301

DECREE FOR IMPROVEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TOURISM

Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 6, 25 Jan 84 pp 1-4

[Text] Decrees of the Council of State

Decree of the Council of State

on Improvement in International Tourism Activities and on Negotiation and Conclusion of Foreign Tourism Contracts

The Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Romania hereby decrees the following:

Article 1. The activities of negotiation and conclusion of foreign contracts for international tourism within the framework of the ONT [National Office of Tourism] Litoral Tourism Center subordinate to the Ministry of Tourism and within the International Automotive Tourism Enterprise subordinate to the Romanian Automobile Club, are hereby transferred to the ONT Carpati International Tourism Enterprise in Bucharest subordinate to the Ministry of Tourism.

Article 2. Negotiation and conclusion of foreign contracts for international tourism, including charter air transportation, will be conducted by individual delegations made up of representatives of the ONT Carpati International Tourism Enterprise, Bucharest, subordinate to the Ministry of Tourism, and of the TAROM Company subordinate to the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications, Department of Civil Aviation.

The Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications, Department of Civil Aviation, will take measures to ensure better coordination of the activities of concluding foreign contracts for tourist services and those of charter air transportation.

Article 3. The international tourism contracts concluded by the ONT Litoral Tourism Center and the International Automotive Tourism Enterprise which have not been executed, as well as collections and payments in foreign exchange made as advances and the pertinent plan indicators, will be transferred to the ONT Carpati International Tourism Enterprise in Bucharest, on the basis of formal agreements.

Article 4. The International Tourist Contracts and Services Management of the ONT Litoral Tourism Center is hereby abolished, with the exception of the Department of Tourist Program, Tourist Transportation, and Control Center Operations, which is to be transferred to the Commercial Management of the Center.

The organizational structure of the ONT Litoral Tourism Center approved by Decree No 162/1973 on establishment of unified structural standards for economic units will be modified to conform to Annex No 1 (which is to be forwarded to the institutions concerned), and the maximum number of positions on the administrative staff proper is to be 90.

Article 5. The sphere of business of the Mercur Foreign Trade Enterprise in Bucharest, subordinate to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Cooperation, as specified in Annex No 9, Paragraph 11, to Decree No 276/1979 on measures for improvement in foreign trade activities, will be replaced with the sphere of business specified in Annex No 2 hereto.

Article 6. Annex No 16(a), with the text given in Annex No 3 hereto, will be inserted after Annex No 16 to Decree No 276/1979 on certain measures for improvement in foreign trade activities.

Article 7. Labor personnel to be transferred from the ONT Litoral Tourism Center and the International Automotive Tourism Enterprises to the ONT Carpati International Tourism Enterprise or to other units will be considered to have been transferred in the interests of the service.

Personnel of the ONT Carpati International Tourism Enterprise in Bucharest, the ONT Litoral Tourism Center, and the International Automotive Tourism Enterprise who are transferred in the interests of the service or are assigned to positions at lower wage levels, as well as personnel discharged as a result of application of the provisions of this decree, will be entitled to the benefits provided in Article 21 of Decree No 162/1973 on establishment of unified structural standards for economic units.

Article 8. The provisions of Decree No 367/1980 on measures for rational utilization of the personnel in socialist units, the applicability of which was extended by Decree No 462/1982, will not be applied for a period of 90 days from the date of this decree to positions on the staff of the ONT Carpati International Tourism Enterprise in Bucharest, the positions from which labor personnel are to be transferred from other units to complete the number of personnel on the staff of the Carpati International Tourism Enterprise in Bucharest, and positions in other units to which personnel are to be transferred from the ONT Litoral Tourism Center and the International Automotive Tourism Center who are reassigned as a result of reorganization.

Article 9. Resolution No 300 of the Council of Ministers of 21 March 1970 on authorization of the Romanian Automobile Club to establish a subsidiary enterprise for international automotive tourism, and any provisions contrary to those of this decree are hereby rescinded.

Article 10. Annexes Nos 1 to 3 will form an integral part of this decree.

NICOLAE CEAUSESCU

President

of the Socialist Republic of Romania

Bucharest, 24 January 1944

No 22

Annex No 2

Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Cooperation

<u>No</u>	<u>Name and Location of enterprise</u>	<u>Subordination of enterprise</u>	<u>Sphere of business, by main groups of products</u>
11	Mercur, Bucharest	Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Cooperation	--trade in consumer goods from stock goods intended for the domestic market with foreign organizations and firms, as well as trade in goods of Central Union of Cooperatives for Production, Purchase, and Marketing of Goods, with cooperative organizations and enterprises of other countries;  --uniform trade in commercial equipment and furnishings for the Ministry of foreign trade;  --importation of goods needed to stock foreign currency transaction shops;  --imports of consumer goods for socialist trade in food products, textiles, footwear, and ready-made clothing;  --importation of detergents and insecticides for household use;  --importation of bicycle tires and inner tubes;  --importation of scythes and woodworking tools for household and industrial use;  --importation of metal notions, buttons, costume jewelry, enamelled vases, household articles of glass, porcelain,

earthenware. crystal, cutlery. conventional watches, oilburning chandeliers and lamps, art metal-work, hunting and target weapons, precious stones, glass beads, figurines, holiday tree decorations.

--importation of record players and spare parts, beach recreation articles, toys, school and office supplies, musical articles, items for smokers, razor blades;

--importation of entertainment devices with spare parts, as well as products marketed specifically through restaurants in the domestic trade and tourism network.

1      ONT Carpati      Ministry of  
         International      Tourism  
         Tourism Enter-  
         prise,  
         Bucharest

--conclusion and execution of foreign contracts for bringing foreign tourists to Romania for vacations, health resort treatment, tours, various athletic events, international congresses and events, excursions to visit relatives and other tourist services as requested, tourist services for foreign motorists, transactions based on credit cards, special excursions;

--provision of tourist services in Romania and abroad for payment in foreign currency, at the request of foreign tourists and individuals and corporations of other countries temporarily in Romania;

--execution of currency exchange and performance of services based on travelers' checks in the city of Bucharest;

--coordination of the activities of Romanian or joint commercial tourist agencies organized according to law;

--conclusion of foreign contracts for excursions organized with Romanian citizens abroad, individually, in groups, or with motorists;

--sale of foreign excursions to the public, under contracts and outside of contracts;



- |   |  |                        |   |
|---|--|------------------------|---|
| 2 | Comturist<br>Foreign Trade<br>Enterprise,<br>Bucharest | Ministry of<br>Tourism | <p>--sale for foreign currency of domestically manufactured goods, imported goods, and imported consignment goods through network of outlets subordinate to Comturist, tourist units, and other authorized units;</p> <p>--shipping abroad of goods bought by foreign tourists, at their request;</p> <p>--retail sale of domestically manufactured goods for foreign exchange to foreign individuals, firms, and organizations;</p> <p>--sale of food items, industrial and craft goods, printed matter, phonograph records, and objets d'art not representing national assets, etc, that may be sold at stands and exhibits on specifically Romanian themes, as well as in Romanian restaurants or culinary events held abroad;</p> <p>--sale of domestically manufactured and imported goods for foreign currency to diplomatic and commercial agencies operating in Romania;</p> <p>--importation of goods which are sold for foreign currency in the Comturist network and which are not imported on a centralized basis for the national economy as a whole. A list of such goods will be drawn up annually by joint order of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Cooperation and the Ministry of Tourism.</p> |
| 3 | Publiturism<br>Tourism Publicity Agency,<br>Bucharest  | Ministry of<br>Tourism | <p>--organization and conduct of publicity and commercial advertising abroad for tourism units in cooperation with publicity agencies, newspapers, magazines, moving picture theaters, radio and television stations, fair and exposition enterprises, billboard companies, etc, abroad;</p> <p>--performance of publicity services (newspaper announcements, exhibits, etc) for foreign firms in publications</p>  |

and suitable areas in stations, localities, and hotel and resort units in Romania;

--organization and conduct of exhibits and other visual advertising media, as well as tourist promotional events abroad (culinary, folklore events, etc);

--preparation, printing, dissemination, and exploitation of tourist propaganda and publicity materials in Romania and abroad, which cannot be incorporated in the format of a book;

--production, dissemination, and exploitation of films and photographic materials of a tourist nature in Romania and abroad.

6115

CSO: 2700/127

## ROMANIA

### VISIT OF ETHIOPIAN PARTY DELEGATION

Received by Dascalescu

AU091230 Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1141 GMT 9 Mar 84

[Text] Bucharest AGERPRES 9 March 1984--Constantin Dascalescu, member of the Executive Political Committee of the CC of the RCP, prime minister of Romania, received on 9 March the Ethiopian party delegation led by Fisseha Desta [spelling as received], assistant secretary-general of the Provisional Military Administrative Council, member of the Executive Committee of the Commission for Organizing the party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE), now on a visit to Romania.

During the talk which passed in a cordial atmosphere, questions were approached related to the further development of the relations of mansided collaboration between Romania and Ethiopia, in keeping with the understandings reached during the Romanian-Ethiopian summit interviews.

Talks With Ceausescu

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[Text] Bucharest AGERPRES 9 March 1984--RCP General Secretary and President of Romania Nicolae Ceausescu received on Friday, 9 March, Fisseha Desta [spelling as received], assistant secretary-general of the Provisional Military Administrative Council, member of the Executive Committee of the Commission for Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE), who, at head of an Ethiopian party delegation, is paying a visit to Romania at the invitation of the CC of the RCP.

The interview was attended by Emil Bobu, member of the Executive Political Committee, secretary of the CC of the RCP.

The guest handed over to the RCP and Romanian state leader a message and conveyed him warm greetings and most cordial wishes from the chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council and of the Commission for Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia, supreme commander of the Revolutionary Army of Socialist Ethiopia, Mengistu Haile Mariam.

Nicolae Ceausescu thanked for the message and requested that the Ethiopian leader be conveyed friendly greetings and best wishes and the Ethiopian people wishes of progress and prosperity.

During the interview, which proceeded in a cordial, friendly atmosphere, satisfaction was expressed at the fact that over the past years the relations between Romania and Ethiopia had witnessed an ascending course on multiple planes following the carrying into effect of the understandings reached during Romanian-Ethiopian summit meetings. The talk highlighted the joint wish to further expand those relations in the political, economic, technical, scientific, cultural and other fields, to amplify and diversify cooperation in top domains of material production for the benefit of the two countries and peoples.

Likewise, high appreciation was given to the productive cooperation between the Romanian Communist Party and the Commission for Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia, as it was assessed that the steady promotion of the links, contacts and dialogue between the two parties contributed to the strengthening of the friendship between the Romanian and Ethiopian peoples, to the development and deepening of the manysided relations between Romania and Ethiopia.

Views were also exchanged on current questions of the international life, and deep concern was expressed at the deterioration of the world situation, especially as a result of the unprecedented escalation of the arms race. It was shown that, under such conditions, firm action was imperiously necessary in order to pass to tangible disarmament measures, first and foremost nuclear disarmament, eliminate force and threat of force from international relations, solve the states of tension and conflict extant in various regions of the world as well as of all interstate differences by negotiated and exclusively peaceful means, resume and continue the policy of detente, collaboration and respect for national independence.

As concerns the conflicts in Africa, the importance was emphasized of their political, negotiated settlement by the African countries and peoples themselves, without any interference from the outside.

Romania and Ethiopia's active solidarity was reasserted on the occasion with all the peoples fighting against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, racism and apartheid, for economic and social emancipation. The two countries' wish was also reasserted to contribute further to the constructive resolution of the major problems that confront mankind, to the creation of a climate of peace, security, collaboration and understanding in Europe, Africa and throughout the world.

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## CEAUSESCU'S VIEWS ON CURRENT ROLE OF SOCIALIST STATE

Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 20 Jan 84 pp 1, 5

[Article by Alexandru Lazarescu: "A Revolutionary View on the Role of the Socialist State in the Current Stage"]

[Text] As is known, a multitude of aspects of human activity, which necessarily entail a proper framework for exercising the leadership of all the processes of social development--that is, a complex system of political and social institutions and bodies, by means of which the whole populace performs its basic functions in the unitary and efficient leadership of society, on the basis of consciously using the objective laws--interpenetrate and condition each other within our society's dialectical evolution along the path of progress and socialist civilization.

Being one of the key links in the complex system of political and social institutions and bodies, a basic component of the political organization of society, the socialist state of revolutionary, working-class democracy, as a principal instrument of power, is the political organization of the people, of the socialist nation, of all the working people, meant to secure the development of the socialist society and to protect the revolutionary gains and the independence and sovereignty of the homeland.

The remarkable capacity of Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, the secretary general of our party, to grasp the role that goes to the socialist state in building the new order is amply reflected in his brilliant theoretical conception according to which Romania's advance along the path to forging the multilaterally developed socialist society and gradually proceeding toward communism implies for a long historical period the matter of raising to a qualitatively higher level the state's role in all economic, social, cultural and educational life. An exponent of the will and interests of the whole society, of all the working people, as their supreme representative and as the organizer of the common life of the whole populace, our socialist state, as is mentioned in our country's basic law--the constitution--"organizes, plans and directs the national economy; it protects socialist property; it guarantees the full exercise of the rights of the citizens, provides for socialist legality, protects the rule of law, develops education, science, art and culture and furnishes health care, and provides for the country's defense and the organization of relations with other states."



## An Organ of Power

Consequently, it can be said that the socialist state of revolutionary, working-class democracy, as an organ of the power of all the working people, as a factor in political leadership, has the task of organizing and managing the economic and social activity and of creating the proper organizational framework for participation by the broad popular masses in the leadership of society. It thus functions as a unitary system within which the relations between its structures and its organization, on the one hand, and the capacity for affirmation of socialist democracy, on the other hand, acquire new possibilities.

Steadily guiding itself by the dialectical and historical materialistic outlook, according to which a certain form of organization and leadership corresponds to each social order, to each period of development of society, our party feels that in the new historical stage that our country has entered a particularly important role will go, in the system of the political organization of our society, to the state of revolutionary, working-class democracy. In connection with this, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu pointed out: "At present, we must understand that both now and for a long period of time, including in the communist society, the state will continue to have an important role in the organization of social life, in the development of society. The forms of activity and the character of the state in relation to the development of society's production forces will change."

In the light of these valuable specifications, it seems as clear as can be that in the current stage of development of our society, when a special accent is being put on the qualitative aspects of the activity--that is, on the problems of achieving a new quality of work and life in all fields--the role of the state of revolutionary, working-class democracy is becoming even greater and more necessary. Grasping the importance of the growth of its role for the continual progress of our society, the secretary general of our party, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, stressed that "we must ensure the functioning of the state of working-class democracy in the spirit of the strictest discipline, order and responsibility on the part of all party and state bodies and organizations."

## An Organizer of the Activity of Socialist Construction

The socialist state's functional characteristics, which bring out its democratic essence, its senses and goals, make evident its role of an organizer in economic and social development, in the securing of the peaceful work of our people in socialist construction, and in the protection of the country's independence and sovereignty.

Consequently, the socialist state of revolutionary, working-class democracy performs its role of a principal instrument of political leadership by fulfilling certain functions, among which the economic and organizational function stands in the forefront of its activity--that is, it represents the main field of affirmation of its prerogatives.

Our socialist state's activity in the economic and organizational field is concretized in the creation of an economic organism with complex structures, which

differ radically from those formed in the course of history, on the basis of carrying out the extensive program for multilateral socialist development of the country.

In close connection with fulfilling the economic and organizational function, an important place within state activity goes, of course, to the sensible placement of the production forces throughout the territory.

The rational, harmonious and balanced distribution of the production forces and, along with this, the elimination of the lagging of some counties and localities and the better utilization and employment of material and human resources represent a decisive direction of our socialist state's economic and organizational activity.

The profound qualitative changes that are occurring throughout the system of our society's production forces as a result of the exercise by the socialist state of its economic and organizational function presuppose in a lawlike way the continual development and improvement of the production and social relations.

The growth of socialist property, the substantiation of the activities of organizing, coordinating and guiding the evolution of all the economic and social processes with the help of the sole national plan, the continual improvement of the distribution according to labor, the expansion and improvement of socialist democracy, the continual improvement of the democratic framework needed for wide, competent and responsible participation by all citizens in running the state, and the permanent concern for continually raising the standard of living of the working people are important, characteristic directions of our state's economic and organizational activity.

#### The Widening of the Horizon of Knowledge--an Essential Concern

Along with fulfilling the economic and organizational function, the socialist state also fulfills the cultural and educational function. Our state's consistent concern for the development of education, science, art and culture, for the socialist education of all the working people, for the widening of the horizon of knowledge and culture, for the assimilation by them of our party's advanced outlook on nature, man and society--dialectical and historical materialism--and of the principles and norms of socialist ethics and equity, for the formation of an advanced attitude toward work and society in them, for the formation of a new man, with a progressive moral and political makeup and an advanced consciousness, represents a major coordinate of its cultural and educational activity.

In this context, it can be stated that the fulfillment of the economic and organizational function by our state is indissolubly connected with the fulfillment of the cultural and educational function. It is worth bearing in mind the fact that, under the current conditions of our society's development, of the growth of the complexity and qualitative level of the tasks of economic and social development, the economic and organizational function and the cultural and educational function of the socialist state of revolutionary, working-class democracy are acquiring a special amplitude.

Besides fulfilling the economic and organizational function and the cultural and educational function, the socialist state also fulfills the function of protecting the revolutionary gains of our people. The fulfillment of this function presupposes, among other things, the protection of our homeland, of the social and state order, of socialist and personal property, of national wealth and, in general, of civil rights and liberties by all members of society.

Besides the above-mentioned functions, our socialist state also has important tasks on a foreign plane.

In connection with this, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that at the basis of its entire foreign activity our state has placed the strict observance of the principles of national independence and sovereignty, equal rights, territorial integrity, noninterference in internal affairs, and mutual advantage, and the affirmation of each people's imprescriptible right to be the master of its own fate and of its national riches.

#### Revolutionary, Working-Class Democracy, a New Concept

According to the scientific view of our party and its secretary general, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, in the particularly complex process of building the multilaterally developed socialist society, the state's forms of activity, its character and its functions expand, evolve and change in relation to the requirements of the stage of development of the social organism, to the growth of the production forces, to the changes that occur in the character of the production relations and in the raising of the level of scientific knowledge, to the objectives that society also proposes, and to the intensification of economic and social activity, in general, continually adapting themselves to social life's necessities and possibilities of progress.

In this context, consequently, it can be asserted that Romanian society's entry into a new, higher phase of its development, the growth of the complexity of the social system in this stage and of the tasks that devolve upon its leadership, and the accentuation of the conscious character and of the qualitative aspects of constructing the new order cannot occur without the organization and mobilization of all the social forces, without the growth and expansion of the role of the state of revolutionary, working-class democracy in the management of economic and social activity.

At the same time, the growth of the state's activity in the current stage is required by its dialectical connections with the nation, that form of human community that has proved historically to be necessary for continually developing the new order and for putting all mankind on the path to communism.

This is the incontestable merit of the secretary general of the party, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, who, grasping this new social and political reality, has formulated new theses in connection with the concept of the socialist state, as an instrument for building and improving the new order, called upon to continually adapt its operating mechanisms to the extensive process of general democratization of our society.

"This is why I believe," Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu stated in this regard, "that it would be possible to consider the replacement of the notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat with the notion of working-class democracy. Such a notion corresponds to the new social realities and underscores the superiority of socialism and communism, as the most democratic and humane order, in which the people are forging in complete freedom, consciously, their own future."

#### Directions and Priorities

The essential changes that will occur in the development and modernization of the production forces, in the socialist production relations, in the relations between people, in the structure of society, and in the improvement of the management and planning activity presuppose the modification of the state's functions, the accentuation of its role of an organizer of economic and social life.

Analyzing scientifically, in the spirit of the dialectical and historical materialistic outlook, the main directions in which the activity of the state of revolutionary, working-class democracy must be developed and expanded, the secretary general of our party, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, stated that "in proportion to the changes that will occur in the structure of society and to the improvement of the management and planning activity, the state's functions will also change, there being accentuated more and more its role as an organizer of economic and social life."

It can be said that the continual adaptation of the state's functions to the requirements of each stage of development of our society, and the modification of some of its functions in the sense of diminishing its repressive aspects and expanding and developing its constructive and organizational functions, through the accentuation of the state's role in the democratic organization and leadership of the aspects of economic and social life, and the direct transfer of some of the state's functions and the prerogatives of its bodies to the staffs of working people, to the various public organizations, to the popular masses, represent an important characteristic of the improvement in state activity in the current stage. In other words, in proportion to the expansion of the social base of the organization, leadership and functioning of the social and economic system and to the expansion of the role of the mass and public organizations, as an expression of the growth of the efficiency of the operating mechanisms of the new society, the organizational and educational functions of the state institutions will take on new forms, while the number and the sphere of action of the coercive institutions, and the activities not productive in themselves, will be reduced, with the leadership of society acquiring a more and more widely democratic character.

In complete conformity with our party's basic orientations in the direction of the improvement of state activity, orientations ordained by the requirements of the current stage of development of our society and by the future tasks, provision is being made for the accentuation of those processes that bring about the widening of the sphere of inclusion of the state's mechanisms and of the social and economic base, more and more profound integration into social life, greater flexibility in the state bodies, prompt adaptation to the requirements of each



stage, the expansion of the democratic character of the power, and the expansion and diversification of the means, forms and ways of exercising it.

In the view of our party and its secretary general, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, there is an indissoluble connection between the process of increasing the socialist state's role and the continual expansion of socialist democratism.

#### The Vitality of Our Socialist Democracy

Pointing out the organic connection between the process of the continual expansion and improvement of socialist democracy and the stronger and stronger affirmation of the state's role in the management of economic and social activity, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu stressed that we will have to act continually to strengthen the ties of the state and its bodies with the people, so that all its bodies always rely, in their activity, on the masses of working people and consistently and steadily protect their interests and, at the same time, so that these bodies are under the permanent control of the broad popular masses, of the whole populace. "In this lies, ultimately, the essential, inseparable aspect of socialist democracy, the concretization of the principle of the government of the state, of society, by the broad popular masses, by the people themselves."

The achievement of closeness between the party, the state and society, the continual integration of the party and the state into the life of our society, the uniting of their activity, and the closer and closer blending of state leadership with party leadership and public leadership represent a characteristic trait of the process of improvement in state activity, in the context of the widening of its social base and of the expansion of its democratic character.

In connection with this, it is important to bear in mind the fact that the secretary general of our party, referring to the role of the state and the party in our society and to the dialectical connection between the communist party and the socialist state, specified that "the state and its highest legislative and executive bodies represent the supreme power in our society.

"The party's leading role in our socialist society does not replace the state bodies under any circumstances, does not and cannot diminish in any form the responsibility of the state bodies to the laws and the people.

"It is necessary for us to eliminate any misunderstanding regarding which one--the party or the state--occupies the principal place in society. No, such a question does not even have to be asked.

"The state and its bodies cannot be replaced by anyone--therefore, not by the party bodies.

"The state and the state bodies are directly responsible for the proper performance of all economic and social activity and for the strengthening of socialist order and discipline.



"The party bodies must not replace the state bodies; on the contrary, they must do everything with a view to the strengthening of the state's role, with a view to the proper functioning of its bodies from top to bottom."

The achievement of closeness between the party and the state in the above-mentioned sense and the progressive integration of these organisms into the life of our society will cause, of course, the gradual transition of our society from political and state leadership to a higher level of organization, based on worker self-leadership.

It is clear, however, that this phenomenon will not come into being by itself, automatically. It must be viewed as an effect of a long dialectical process that is necessarily based on the continual expansion of the forms of collaboration between the worker bodies and the state's bodies, they complementing each other and giving a more and more democratic character to our socialist society, providing for the organized participation of all social categories in running the country.

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# IMPORTANCE OF PRENUPTIAL MEDICAL EXAMINATION STRESSED

Bucharest SANATATEA in Romanian Feb 84 p 13

[Article by Dr Aurel Nicolescu: "The Prenuptial Certificate"]

[Text] A (clinical and laboratory) medical examination is absolutely necessary, useful and also obligatory for the issuance of a prenuptial certificate. This involves a complex medical examination consisting of a general clinical examination, neuropsychic, dermato-venereal, endocrinological, and gynecological examinations, microradiophotographic (MRF) or plumonary radioscopic examinations and serological examinations (RBW).

The purpose of this examination is to certify the health of young people who are carrying out such an important social act as marriage. During this medical examination, a number of diseases are diagnosed which might cause the postponement of the marriage until the sick person is completely cured (such as pulmonary tuberculosis, dermato-venereal diseases, etc.) or the treatment of the sick person in a dispensary.

Persons suffering from neuropsychic and endocrinological-genital diseases and from sterility--both males and females--are sent to the departments and clinics of endocrinology, gynecology, urology, psychiatry, etc.

The gynecological examination of young women who are to be married is supplemented by basic information on the anatomy and the physiology of reproduction, elements of sex education, information on the dangers of abortion, especially in the first pregnancy, elements of family planning, such as the best number of children, the best age for bearing children (the best age for reproduction), the best length of time between children, and, in the case of medical contraindications for pregnancy (genetic problems, the danger of genetic transmissions of a cardiovascular disease which make pregnancy inadvisable--mitral stenosis, mitral valvulopathy, renal lithiasis, etc), information on contraception and on sexual hygiene.

The psychological examination is supplemented by advice on harmony and understanding in the family, hygiene in the home and planning of the family budget.

Thus, the issuance of a prenuptial medical certificate does not represent a simple formality. It is a medical and social act which aims at the detection

of diseases which can endanger the health or the procreative capacities of the future parents and at the organization of health education activities intended to lead to the modification of the demographic behavior of the young couples. Indeed, the prenuptial medical examination aims at the detection of organic causes which might generate diseases in families and contributes to preventing divorces and to providing the proper assistance to young people at an important moment in their lives.

At present, in the dispensary-polyclinic of Sector 2 in Bucharest there is a premarital counselling office which has the mission of assisting couples in undergoing these medical examinations and issuing prenuptial certificates.

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BRIEFS

REMOVAL OF DEPUTY MINISTERS--The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Comrade Ion Bivolaru is relieved of his position as deputy minister of the chemical industry and Comrade Nicolae Militaru is relieved of his position as deputy minister of industrial construction. [Excerpts] [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 11, 8 Feb 84 p 3]

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